Lawsuit: In Session MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27

[Smallfries]

Case Filing

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CIVIL ACTION


MegaMinerM (Represented by Dragon Law Firm)
Plaintiff

Spoiler: Proof of Representation

v.

Blazora Corporation
Defendant
Nexalin
Agent of the Defendant

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff complains against the Defendant as follows:

Blazora Corporation (allegedly formerly known as Easy Corporation) has failed to pay out owed interest, and has not paid back its allegedly called bond. At the time of writing, Blazora Corporation owes three full months of interest to MegaMinerM, totalling $70,402.

In addition, Blazora has breached the implied contract between company and stakeholder, misrepresented its offer to the investing public and bondholders, committed fraud in the omission of supposed terms of the bond, fraudulently manipulated the market for its own gain, falsely advertised, and authorized misleading advertising.

This case mirrors a previous case where former President lcn sued the same company over the same bond and a similar failure to pay. There are four key differences here, however. First, two months have elapsed since the alleged wrongdoing, adding treble time to the duration in controversy in that case. Second, the amount of shares is nearly 150% greater, showing a great magnitude of investment. Third, the Defendant in this case was put on notice by that case, being Defendant there as well, and should have known to promptly pay the remainder of the interest, but did not. This is inexcusable and outrageous. Finally, the Defendant—perhaps illegally—called the bond they promised would extend until July. Even if accepted as legal, this bond has not been paid back the last two weeks, and the Defendant continues to enjoy the benefits of the bond investment, interest-free. This cannot stand.

In the previous case, the court agreed that the wide range and high dollar value of those offenses should, did, and continued to warrant a high level of scrutiny. The Plaintiff’s counsel in that case humbly petitioned the court for steep punitive damages in order to correct the anti-social behavior on display by the Defendant, and the court readily agreed with no hesitation. It appears even that steep amount did not dissuade the Defendant from his outrageous behavior, and MegaMinerM pleads with the court to follow precedent and put an end to this farce once and for all by levying the award requested below, both to firmly educate the Defendant on his errors, and to serve as an example forever to those that would commit such reprehensible offenses in the future. The Plaintiff here has seen the Defendant refuse to own up to their contractual obligations and even a refusal to amicably negotiate, and has no choice but to file suit here now.

I. PARTIES
1. MegaMinerM (Plaintiff & Bondholder)
2. Nexalin (Agent of Defendant)

II. FACTS
1. On 23 September 2024, Nexalin founded Easy Corporation and thereafter listed a bond with a face value of $1,000,000 on The Exchange, a stock exchange hosting several business ventures and entities based in Redmont. This bond was listed under the CUSIP number “EZC24-6M”.

2. On 27 September 2024, MegaMinerM purchased 2,604 shares of this bond through a market buy order. The bonds have a face value of $100 each, totalling $260,400. The bonds held a monthly interest rate of 7.0% and were said to have a maturity date of 1 January 2025. The official issuing date was 1 October 2024.

3. On 5 November 2024, fellow bondholder lcn privately dm’d Nexalin to ask for interest to be paid. Nexalin responded simply with, “Yeah.” Interest was not paid.

4. After all of October and November passed without payment, on 15 December 2024 fellow bondholder lcn publicly asked in The Exchange general chat: “@nexalin interest plz #ezc24-6m,” to which Nexalin quickly replied “Will go out today.” Interest was not paid.

5. Later that day, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers (presumably at the behest of Nexalin) said that Easy Corporation “Has been taking aggressive steps to prepare for launch,” and they “Plan[ned] to launch by summer 2025.”

6. On 16 December 2024, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers (presumably at the behest of Nexalin) reached out to officially begin a bondholder’s vote as to the matter of extending the bond’s interest payments by six months.

7. On 22 December 2024, Nexalin filed a Corporation Registration for Blazora Corporation. The documents of this incorporation do not list Easy Corporation in any capacity, nor is there any office announcement on the Easy Corporation (now Blazora Corporation) discord server or the Easy Corporation bond (now Blazora Corporation bond).

8. On 30 December 2024, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers (presumably at the behest of Nexalin) said that the previous vote to extend the duration of the bond had passed, and it would be extended for six months. At this time, Stoppers also announced that “[The] bond and the issuing company (Easy Corporation) have both been named to Blazora.” Nowhere in the publicly shown terms for the bond was this shown to be a potential option. Approximately ten minutes later, the first (of nine) interest payments were paid out.

9. On 31 December 2024, a conference room within Dragon Law Firm was created to ask the Defendant’s agent, Nexalin, to resolve the breach of contract in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18 up to that point. Nexalin did not respond.

10. On 2 January 2025, an attorney for fellow bondholder lcn made an official demand for relief, stating lcn’s willingness to resolve the matter amicably if: (1) Immediate payment of all overdue interest was met, (2) A formal explanation of the delays and assurance of compliance going forward was provided, and (3) Reimbursement of lcn’s legal fees. Nexalin did not respond. Later that day, Exchange CEO Stoppers announced that Blazora Corporation had officially paid its second of nine interest payments.

11. On 6 January 2025, the attorney representing fellow bondholder lcn pinged Nexalin. Nexalin responded with “We are all caught up on bond payments.” The attorney responded “No, you are still missing the bond payment for the first of January.” Nexalin did not respond, and instead left the discord.

12. Later that day, Exchange CEO Stoppers posted that the reason for the failure to pay the third owed month was that the bond’s terms gave them the right to disallow interest to be charged on October, with the first month where interest would be accrued being November. The above terms were provided in the form of a screenshot to a restricted channel, and dated to 23 September 2024, when the bonds were first listed. These newly revealed terms also said that interest will be paid at the end of each month, and that the bond term was to last from 1 October 2024 to 31 March 2025, a period of six months. This is contradictory to the listing information, which said the bond would mature on 1 January 2025. The Exchange claimed they would “[Take] full responsibility for any inconvenience caused by our failure to adequately communicate these terms.”

13. On 13 February 2025, fellow bondholder lcn filed suit against Blazora Corporation alleging $274,983.89 in damages.

14. On 25 February 2025, Judge Dartanboy of the Federal Court of Redmont issued summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, agreeing that there were no material facts at issue. All damages were upheld, except one portion of the compensatory damages and part of the legal fees. The Judge in that case awarded $233,752.48 in damages, not diminishing any punitive damages.

15. Two days later, on 27 February 2025, Exchange CEO Stoppers announced Defendant had “called” the bond, and had promised that “all interest due to-date along with the bond’s principal” would be paid.

16. On March 8 2025, Plaintiff asked in the Public Exchange General Chat "when will bondholders be paid out?" Later that day, he pinged Defendant's agent. The Agent never responded.

17. As of 17 March 2025, no additional interest past the second payment two and a half months prior nor the principal has been paid.

18. The bond was promised to mature on 1 July 2025. This is four extra months of interest, bringing the total interest payments had the contract been fulfilled to $163,505.

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
1. MegaMinerM and Defendant entered in to an implied contract upon the purchase of the bonds. According to the Contracts Act § 4, the five elements necessary to enter in to a contract are: (a) Offer, (b) Acceptance, (c) Consideration, (d) Intent, and (e) Capacity. Contracts do not need to be written out expressly, but can be implied. According to § 6 of the Act, a contract that meets those requirements is valid and enforceable. According to § 7 of the Act, a breach of contract may result in remedies of damages, specific performance, or other equitable relief.

2. According to the Contracts Act § 8, Misrepresentation “Happens when a false statement induces another party to enter into a contract.
. . .
Remedies for misrepresentation may include rescission, damages, or other appropriate relief.”

3. According to the Commercial Standards Act § 6, Fraud is the “Intentional or reckless misrepresentation or omission of an important fact . . . to a victim who justifiably relies on that misrepresentation; and the victim . . . suffered actual, quantifiable injury or damages as a result of the misrepresentation or omission.” This carries a fine of up to $10,000 plus damages.

4. According to the Commercial Standards Act § 6, False Advertising is “The act of authorizing a false advertisement for publication.” The maximum fine for this offense is $5,000.

5. According to the Commercial Standards Act § 6, Misleading Advertising is “The act of authorizing a misleading advertisement for publication.” The maximum fine for this offense is $5,000.

6. According to the Commercial Standards Act § 8, Market Manipulation is “The act of fraudulently inflating or deflating the value of a company or asset of which you have a responsibility for.” This carries a fine of up to $10,000 plus damages.

7. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into another contract on 30 December 2024, when the vote extended the bond’s terms to 1 July 2025. The terms of this agreement stated that “[Defendant’s bond’s] interest payments have been extended by an additional 6 months to 1 July 2025. This means an additional interest payment for each month during the extended period.” This contract does not mention the bond being callable, and after this binding vote the Defendant did not have a right to call until the bond had fully matured. The Plaintiff is owed compensatory damages up until the contractual maturation of the bond.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Plaintiff seeks the following from the Defendant:

1. $70,402 of compensatory damages as a direct result of the breach of contract, following Blazora Corporation’s failure to pay three months of interest, further including the combined future value of each of the three months where no owed interest was paid, if MegaMinerM had received and then reinvested the interest at the time of their payment. Calculated by taking the amounts owed, multiplying each by the formula "x * (1.07)^t", where x is the interest per month owed and t is the amount of time in months from the last paid-for month until now (that being November, so December, January, and February), and adding them together. This is done one more time for the half of the month of March that the bond has remained unpaid, in compensation for Defendant illegally and immorally retaining the bond value for interest-free loans.

2. $97,555 of compensatory damages as a result of the breach of the second contract produced by the announcement of the extension of the bond to 1 July 2025 and then its unceremonious and illegal breach on 27 February 2025. Had the bond fulfilled the last four months of promised interest, the Plaintiff would have earned four extra interest payments. This amount further includes the combined future value of those four months of interest, assuming MegaMinerM had received and then reinvested the interest at the time of their payment. Calculated by taking the amounts owed, multiplying each by the formula "x * (1.07)^t", where x is the interest per month owed and t is the amount of time in months from February until July, and adding them together.

3. $260,400 of compensatory damages as a result of withholding the face value of the bond from MegaMinerM. Plaintiff is entitled to this as a matter of law, as this is the value of the bonds held in his name.

3. $125,000 of punitive damages due to Misrepresentation by Defendant as defined by the Contracts Act. In lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18, this amount was $25,000, $5,000 for each time lcn and Defendant entered into a contract through the former’s purchase of bonds due to misrepresentation(s) made by Defendant. Here, that amount is multiplied by five due to the difference in compensatory values between the plaintiff in that case and this one being roughly five and a third greater. This takes into account the three times increase in missed payments, time and a half’ing of face value of held bonds, and the Defendant being previously put on notice. It should also be noted that because the Plaintiff purchased all of their shares in one market order, and the damages in lcn were calculated based on the amount of orders, Plaintiff here would get less than the Plaintiff in that case, despite arguably suffering far more in quantity of shares and length of time. As a result, Plaintiff argues that the amount of orders to purchase the shares should not matter, as buying all of the shares in one go would produce one amount of damages, and buying each of the over 2,000 shares one by one would produce a value in the tens of millions. For consistency, the court should use the method described above.

4. $250,000 of punitive damages due to Fraud by Defendant as defined by the Commercial Standards Act. In lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18, this amount was $50,000, $10,000 for each of the five times lcn justifiably relied upon a misrepresentation(s), and lcn suffered actual, quantifiable injury. Here, that amount is multiplied by five due to the difference in compensatory values between the plaintiff in that case and this one being roughly five and a third greater. This takes into account the three times increase in missed payments, time and a half’ing of face value of held bonds, and the Defendant being previously put on notice. It should also be noted that because the Plaintiff purchased all of their shares in one market order, and the damages in lcn were calculated based on the amount of orders, Plaintiff here would get less than the Plaintiff in that case, despite arguably suffering far more in quantity of shares and length of time. As a result, Plaintiff argues that the amount of orders to purchase the shares should not matter, as buying all of the shares in one go would produce one amount of damages, and buying each of the over 2,000 shares one by one would produce a value in the tens of millions. For consistency, the court should use the method described above.

5. $25,000 of punitive damages due to False Advertising by Defendant as defined by the Commercial Standards Act. In lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18, this amount was $5,000, $5,000 for each time Defendant authorized a false advertisement for publication. Here, that amount is multiplied by five due to the difference in compensatory values between the plaintiff in that case and this one being roughly five and a third greater. This takes into account the three times increase in missed payments, time and a half’ing of face value of held bonds, and the Defendant being previously put on notice.

6. $25,000 of punitive damages due to Misleading Advertising by Defendant as defined by the Commercial Standards Act. In lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18, this amount was $5,000, $5,000 for each time Defendant authorized a misleading advertisement for publication. Here, that amount is multiplied by five due to the difference in compensatory values between the plaintiff in that case and this one being roughly five and a third greater. This takes into account the three times increase in missed payments, time and a half’ing of face value of held bonds, and the Defendant being previously put on notice.

7. $50,000 of punitive damages due to Market Manipulation by Defendant as defined by the Commercial Standards Act. In lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18, this amount was $10,000, $10,000 for each time Defendant fraudulently inflated or deflated a company or asset of which they had a responsibility for. Here, that amount is multiplied by five due to the difference in compensatory values between the plaintiff in that case and this one being roughly five and a third greater. This takes into account the three times increase in missed payments, time and a half’ing of face value of held bonds, and the Defendant being previously put on notice. It should also be noted that because the Plaintiff purchased all of their shares in one market order, and the damages in lcn were calculated based on the amount of orders, Plaintiff here would get less than the Plaintiff in that case, despite arguably suffering far more in quantity of shares and length of time. As a result, Plaintiff argues that the amount of orders to purchase the shares should not matter, as buying all of the shares in one go would produce one amount of damages, and buying each of the over 2,000 shares one by one would produce a value in the tens of millions. For consistency, the court should use the method described above.

8. $400,000 of punitive damages due to the Defendant’s flagrant, obscene, and outrageous violations of the law and basic moral and commercial decency. Defendant was previously fined $100,000 for a previous similar violation. Given that the Defendant evidently did not learn their lesson in that case, and the trebling of months elapsed in this case, and the breach of a second contract, and the interest of the court in harshly discriminating against this behavior, and more then quintuple the compensatory damages in this case, and the horrendous implications of allowing one to hold on to called bond principals for interest-free loans, Plaintiff feels it is fair to allow for a four-fold increase in punitive damages to discourage Defendant and other anti-social actors once and for all. Plaintiff maintains that the court was correct in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR in their ruling that the conduct of Defendant there “so shocked the conscience and was so monstrous in orchestration that no reasonable person could see it as anything except manifestly against the public interest, requiring sharp and steep correction.” Despite repeated previous reminders, petitions by that Plaintiff and this one, and a high-value court case, Defendant has taken zero interest in rectifying their behavior. These punitive damages further take into account the theft of interest from the end of February until now, and theft from voiding the second contract with no recourse. The court must put an end to this anti-market activity with zealous urgency.

9. $391,007.10 in legal fees as stipulated by the Legal Damages Act § 9.

V. EVIDENCE

Spoiler: P-001

Spoiler: P-002

Spoiler: P-003

Spoiler: P-004

Spoiler: P-005

Spoiler: P-006

Spoiler: P-007

Spoiler: P-008

Spoiler: P-009

Spoiler: P-010

Spoiler: P-011

Spoiler: P-012

Spoiler: P-013

Spoiler: P-014

Spoiler: P-015

Spoiler: P-016

Spoiler: P-017

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This seventeen day of March 2025

 

[ColonelKai]

Writ of Summons

@Nexalin is required to appear before the Federal Court in the case of MegaMinerM v. Blazora Corporation [2025] FCR 27

Failure to appear within 72 hours of this summons will result in a default judgement based on the known facts of the case.

Both parties should make themselves aware of the Court Rules and Procedures, including the option of an in-game trial should both parties request one.

 

[Nexalin]

Present

 

[Dartanboy]

I will be representing the Defendant, your honor.

 

[ColonelKai]

You have 72 hours to submit a response to complaint.

 

[Smallfries]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Though not covered by a Motion to Recuse, the Plaintiff believes it improper and highly suspect that the Judicial Officer that presided and ruled in a strongly related case or controversy represents the Defendant in this case, doubly so when the Judicial Officer then ruled against the same Defendant they represent now.

 

[Dartanboy]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Though not covered by a Motion to Recuse, the Plaintiff believes it improper and highly suspect that the Judicial Officer that presided and ruled in a strongly related case or controversy represents the Defendant in this case, doubly so when the Judicial Officer then ruled against the same Defendant they represent now.

Your honor,

I am not a Judicial Officer, and as an Attorney I am permitted to, and in fact required to, represent my clients' interests.

 

[ColonelKai]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT

OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Though not covered by a Motion to Recuse, the Plaintiff believes it improper and highly suspect that the Judicial Officer that presided and ruled in a strongly related case or controversy represents the Defendant in this case, doubly so when the Judicial Officer then ruled against the same Defendant they represent now.

I dont believe it is within the courts purview to disallow lawyers from representing due to Conflict of Interest. Unless the plaintiff can bring up any legal ground, the court sees no threat to the integrity of the case.

 

[Smallfries]

I dont believe it is within the courts purview to disallow lawyers from representing due to Conflict of Interest. Unless the plaintiff can bring up any legal ground, the court sees no threat to the integrity of the case.

Your honor,

The Plaintiff concedes that there does not appear to be any statutory legal grounds for the removal of a lawyer based on Conflicts of Interest incurred as a result of previously ruling on a case as a Judicial Officer.

However, the Plaintiff maintains that this is still an odd and unsatisfactory situation that produces an innate revulsion. It should be noted that the Plaintiff does not ask for this lightly, nor simply because Opposing Counsel was previously a Judicial Officer at all—but because Opposing Counsel, when they were a Judicial Officer, ruled on a case that arose out of the same case or controversy as this one. It cannot be denied that this case arises out of the same roots as another case, nor can it be denied that the Opposing Counsel here was the Judicial Officer that ruled in that case.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Honorable Judge here to consider the implications, odd circumstances, and potentially uncouth precedent allowing this situation to continue may present. The Plaintiff contends that in no cases should any Counsel be allowed to represent a client in a matter they previously ruled on as a Judicial Officer, or Vice Versa.

 

[Dartanboy]

Your honor,

The Plaintiff concedes that there does not appear to be any statutory legal grounds for the removal of a lawyer based on Conflicts of Interest incurred as a result of previously ruling on a case as a Judicial Officer.

However, the Plaintiff maintains that this is still an odd and unsatisfactory situation that produces an innate revulsion. It should be noted that the Plaintiff does not ask for this lightly, nor simply because Opposing Counsel was previously a Judicial Officer at all—but because Opposing Counsel, when they were a Judicial Officer, ruled on a case that arose out of the same case or controversy as this one. It cannot be denied that this case arises out of the same roots as another case, nor can it be denied that the Opposing Counsel here was the Judicial Officer that ruled in that case.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Honorable Judge here to consider the implications, odd circumstances, and potentially uncouth precedent allowing this situation to continue may present. The Plaintiff contends that in no cases should any Counsel be allowed to represent a client in a matter they previously ruled on as a Judicial Officer, or Vice Versa.

Objection

BREACH OF PROCEDURE

This is neither an Objection nor Motion. The matter has already been ruled upon. We ask these comments be stricken from the record.

 

[Smallfries]

Objection

BREACH OF PROCEDURE

This is neither an Objection nor Motion. The matter has already been ruled upon. We ask these comments be stricken from the record.

Your honor,

Nothing was ruled on, no final decision was made. Further, this is a matter of importance before the Court and the comments above were an important explanation to a legitimate grievance the Plaintiff has.

 

[Dartanboy]

I request a 24 hour extension beyond the deadline due to IRL circumstances.

 

[ColonelKai]

Objection

BREACH OF PROCEDURE

This is neither an Objection nor Motion. The matter has already been ruled upon. We ask these comments be stricken from the record.

Your honor,

Nothing was ruled on, no final decision was made. Further, this is a matter of importance before the Court and the comments above were an important explanation to a legitimate grievance the Plaintiff has.

Objection sustained on technicality. Should have filed a motion to reconsider.

However, in the interest of saving everyone time, I will respond to what will likely be just pasted into a MoR otherwise.

Your honor,

The Plaintiff concedes that there does not appear to be any statutory legal grounds for the removal of a lawyer based on Conflicts of Interest incurred as a result of previously ruling on a case as a Judicial Officer.

However, the Plaintiff maintains that this is still an odd and unsatisfactory situation that produces an innate revulsion. It should be noted that the Plaintiff does not ask for this lightly, nor simply because Opposing Counsel was previously a Judicial Officer at all—but because Opposing Counsel, when they were a Judicial Officer, ruled on a case that arose out of the same case or controversy as this one. It cannot be denied that this case arises out of the same roots as another case, nor can it be denied that the Opposing Counsel here was the Judicial Officer that ruled in that case.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests the Honorable Judge here to consider the implications, odd circumstances, and potentially uncouth precedent allowing this situation to continue may present. The Plaintiff contends that in no cases should any Counsel be allowed to represent a client in a matter they previously ruled on as a Judicial Officer, or Vice Versa.

I will be ruling against this once again. The only concern that may arise here is that the defense's counsel may be unable, unwilling or otherwise hindered in properly representing their client. However, this is entirely the choice of the client. If they believe in the abilities and resolution of their counsel, that is their choice. This is not a matter which threatens the courts integrity, unless the defense shows behaviour unbecoming of a lawyer in the federal court, which would be dealt with accordingly. I will not set the precedent of making choices on who to choose as legal counsel on behalf of private citizens who are perfectly capable of decision making on their own. The court will not see another motion to reconsider unless new legal ground can be provided.

I request a 24 hour extension beyond the deadline due to IRL circumstances.

Granted.

 

[Dartanboy]

Answer to Complaint

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

MegaMinerM
Plaintiff

v.

Blazora Corporation
Defendant

I. ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
1. AFFIRM that “on 23 September 2024, Nexalin founded Easy Corporation and thereafter listed a bond with a face value of $1,000,000 on The Exchange, a stock exchange hosting several business ventures and entities based in Redmont. This bond was listed under the CUSIP number “EZC24-6M”.”
2. AFFIRM that “on 27 September 2024, MegaMinerM purchased 2,604 shares of this bond through a market buy order. The bonds have a face value of $100 each, totalling $260,400. The bonds held a monthly interest rate of 7.0% and were said to have a maturity date of 1 January 2025. The official issuing date was 1 October 2024.”
3. AFFIRM that “on 5 November 2024, fellow bondholder lcn privately dm’d Nexalin to ask for interest to be paid. Nexalin responded simply with, “Yeah.”” NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that Interest was not paid.
4. AS FOR “after all of October and November passed without payment, on 15 December 2024 fellow bondholder lcn publicly asked in The Exchange general chat: “@nexalin interest plz #ezc24-6m,” to which Nexalin quickly replied “Will go out today.” Interest was not paid.” AFFIRM that the message was sent, however NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY whether interest was paid in October, November, and/or after the message.
5. AFFIRM that "later that day, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers said that Easy Corporation “Has been taking aggressive steps to prepare for launch,” and they “Plan[ned] to launch by summer 2025.”” however NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that this was done at the behest of Nexalin and/or Blazora Corporation.
6. AFFIRM that “on 16 December 2024, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers reached out to officially begin a bondholder’s vote as to the matter of extending the bond’s interest payments by six months.” however NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that this was done at the behest of Nexalin and/or Blazora Corporation.
7. AFFIRM that “on 22 December 2024, Nexalin filed a Corporation Registration for Blazora Corporation. The documents of this incorporation do not list Easy Corporation in any capacity, nor is there any office announcement on the Easy Corporation (now Blazora Corporation) discord server or the Easy Corporation bond (now Blazora Corporation bond).”
8. AFFIRM that “on 30 December 2024, an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers said that the previous vote to extend the duration of the bond had passed, and it would be extended for six months. At this time, Stoppers also announced that “[The] bond and the issuing company (Easy Corporation) have both been named to Blazora.”” however NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that this was done at the behest of Nexalin and/or Blazora Corporation. NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY “Nowhere in the publicly shown terms for the bond was this shown to be a potential option. Approximately ten minutes later, the first (of nine) interest payments were paid out.”
9. AFFIRM that “on 31 December 2024, a conference room within Dragon Law Firm was created to ask the Defendant’s agent, Nexalin, to resolve the breach of contract in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, [2025] FCR 18 up to that point.” however NOTE that while this was the perceived reason from the Plaintiff’s perspective, we NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that there was Breach of Contract.
10. AFFIRM that “on 2 January 2025, an attorney for [lcn] made an official demand for relief, stating lcn’s willingness to resolve the matter amicably if: (1) Immediate payment of all overdue interest was met, (2) A formal explanation of the delays and assurance of compliance going forward was provided, and (3) Reimbursement of lcn’s legal fees. Nexalin did not respond. Later that day, Exchange CEO Stoppers announced that Blazora Corporation had officially paid its second of nine interest payments.” however NOTE that while this was the perceived necessary damages from the Plaintiff’s perspective, we NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that there was any overdue interest.
11. AFFIRM that “on 6 January 2025, the attorney representing [lcn] pinged Nexalin. Nexalin responded with “We are all caught up on bond payments.” The attorney responded “No, you are still missing the bond payment for the first of January.” Nexalin did not respond” however NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that Nexalin “instead left the discord.”
12. AFFIRM that “later that day, Exchange CEO Stoppers posted that the reason for the failure to pay the third owed month was that the bond’s terms gave them the right to disallow interest to be charged on October, with the first month where interest would be accrued being November. The above terms were provided in the form of a screenshot to a restricted channel, and dated to 23 September 2024, when the bonds were first listed. These newly revealed terms also said that interest will be paid at the end of each month, and that the bond term was to last from 1 October 2024 to 31 March 2025, a period of six months. This is contradictory to the listing information, which said the bond would mature on 1 January 2025. The Exchange claimed they would “[Take] full responsibility for any inconvenience caused by our failure to adequately communicate these terms.””
13. AFFIRM that “On 13 February 2025, fellow bondholder lcn filed suit against Blazora Corporation alleging $274,983.89 in damages.”
14. DENY that “On 25 February 2025, Judge Dartanboy of the Federal Court of Redmont issued summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, agreeing that there were no material facts at issue.” NOTING that the associated Motion and Decision was improperly labeled, and what actually occurred was a Default Judgement (when a party does not appear), as opposed to a Summary Judgement (when both parties agree on the facts). AFFIRM that “All damages were upheld, except one portion of the compensatory damages and part of the legal fees. The Judge in that case awarded $233,752.48 in damages, not diminishing any punitive damages.” Also NOTE that the Judge spoke publicly on the matter later, explaining that some of the punitive damages were because “the Defense [didn’t] show up” [see Exhibit D-001].
15. AFFIRM that “Two days later, on 27 February 2025, Exchange CEO Stoppers announced Defendant had “called” the bond, and had promised that “all interest due to-date along with the bond’s principal” would be paid.”
16. AFFIRM that “On March 8 2025, Plaintiff asked in the Public Exchange General Chat "when will bondholders be paid out?" Later that day, he pinged Defendant's agent. The Agent never responded.” however NOTE that this money is sitting in The Exchange, and it is no fault of the Defendant that the balance has not been distributed by The Exchange.
17. NEITHER AFFIRM NOR DENY that “As of 17 March 2025, no additional interest past the second payment two and a half months prior nor the principal has been paid.”
18. DENY that “The bond was promised to mature on 1 July 2025. This is four extra months of interest, bringing the total interest payments had the contract been fulfilled to $163,505.” as the Defendant still reserved the right to call the bond [see Exhibit P-006].

II. DEFENSES
1. The Plaintiff agreed to a modified contract by voting “Aye” in P-007. This modified contract extended the bond term, but did not remove the callability of the bond by the Defendant. As such, when the bond was called in February, only the principal amount and the interest for November, December, and January (3 months) were owed. 2 months were already paid out per the Plaintiff’s Facts and Evidence. Thus, only 1 interest payment + the principal should be returned to the Plaintiff.

2. The principal amount is still in The Exchange, and it is not the Defendant’s fault it has not been returned to the Plaintiff. Thus, the Defendant is not liable for these “damages.”

3. The Plaintiff is suing the Defendant for damages when The Exchange miscommunicated the bond terms – not the Defendant. This is admitted by both the Plaintiff and the Exchange in Fact 12 and Evidence P-008.

Evidence

Spoiler: ”Exhibit D-001”

By making this submission, I agree I understand the penalties of lying in court and the fact that I am subject to perjury should I knowingly make a false statement in court.

DATED: This 24th day of March 2025.

 

[Dartanboy]

Your honor, I apologize we were a few minutes late. The IRL matters have been sorted and it won't happen again.

 

[juniperfig]

Greetings. I will be presiding over this case until April 2nd, as Kai is on a leave of absence.

The late submission will be allowed.

Discovery is now open for a period of 72 hours. Extensions may be granted if mutually agreed upon by both parties.

 

[Smallfries]

I will be ruling against this once again. The only concern that may arise here is that the defense's counsel may be unable, unwilling or otherwise hindered in properly representing their client.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Plaintiff submits that the ruling above be granted a final reconsideration, on the basis that:

1. The subject matter at-hand has its roots and is formed from the same case and controversy as a similar previous case, lcn v. Blazora Corporation,

2. That case was presided over and ruled on by the Learned and Honorable Judge Dartanboy,

3. The Plaintiff finds deep internal turmoil in the fact that the Judge that ruled on the case arising out of the same case or controversy is now opposing counsel for this case,

4. The opposing counsel has, in Answer to Complaint § 14, stated that "the associated Motion and Decision was improperly labeled, and what actually occurred was a Default Judgement (when a party does not appear), as opposed to a Summary Judgement (when both parties agree on the facts),"

5. The associated motion by the Plaintiff in that case was for a Summary Judgment, and the Learned and Honorable Judge later said the court would be in recess until Summary Judgment was delivered,

6. A Summary Judgment must be motioned for by a party as a request for the judge to make a decision without trial if there are no disputed facts, seeking a final ruling,

7. A Default Judgment is when a Defendant fails to submit a complaint, and "failure to include the necessary information is grounds for the [plaintiff] to request the presiding judge to grant default judgment." [Emphasis added],

8. The Plaintiff in that case did not request Default Judgment,

9. The Plaintiff in that case did specifically request Summary Judgment, as the Defendant's failure to contest any claims meant as a matter of law the Plaintiff was entitled to Summary Judgment, and

10. Opposing counsel has used their previous station as a Judge to improperly re-interpret their own previous rulings to argue and attempt to benefit in this case, therefore,

Opposing counsel, subconsciously or otherwise, has improperly used their previous rulings as a Judge to re-interpret or ex post facto (ruling after the fact) say their previous decision as a Judge meant something it very clearly does not.

The Plaintiff is extremely worried that, even if this was a mistake done in good faith, it could be done again on a more serious matter, in another case, or by a future bad actor that would seek to allow the spectre of their previous experience on the bench to manipulate the law as they so chose after leaving the bench.

This is further compounded by opposing counsel's point late in § 14 where they state: "Also NOTE that the Judge spoke publicly on the matter later, explaining that some of the punitive damages were because “the Defense [didn’t] show up” [see Exhibit D-001]."

Even if opposing counsel's assertion is correct, in good faith, and entirely truthful, it cannot be denied that allowing this sort of behavior to occur is irreconcilable with the duties of a Judicial Officer.

If I could serve on the bench, make rulings, and then later in private practice "interpret" my own rulings in any way I pleased, it would be quite difficult to say I was wrong, as only I, the judge in that case, truly knew what I was thinking upon the making of the ruling, and saying otherwise is a daunting—not to mention unfalsifiable—proposition.

The Plaintiff requests that the learned and Honorable Judge in this case take a stand against this potential flaw in our justice system. In two separate instances, within the same point, opposing counsel either changed/misrepresented a previous ruling, or improperly interpreted his own ruling to his client's benefit. This could surely be in good faith and an honest mistake—but it makes no sense to allow this kind of behavior.

The Plaintiff humbly requests opposing counsel in this case be dismissed, any benefits conferred upon opposing counsel by the Defense be remitted, and the Defense being granted a reasonable amount of time to search for new counsel.

 

[Dartanboy]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Plaintiff submits that the ruling above be granted a final reconsideration, on the basis that:

1. The subject matter at-hand has its roots and is formed from the same case and controversy as a similar previous case, lcn v. Blazora Corporation,

2. That case was presided over and ruled on by the Learned and Honorable Judge Dartanboy,

3. The Plaintiff finds deep internal turmoil in the fact that the Judge that ruled on the case arising out of the same case or controversy is now opposing counsel for this case,

4. The opposing counsel has, in Answer to Complaint § 14, stated that "the associated Motion and Decision was improperly labeled, and what actually occurred was a Default Judgement (when a party does not appear), as opposed to a Summary Judgement (when both parties agree on the facts),"

5. The associated motion by the Plaintiff in that case was for a Summary Judgment, and the Learned and Honorable Judge later said the court would be in recess until Summary Judgment was delivered,

6. A Summary Judgment must be motioned for by a party as a request for the judge to make a decision without trial if there are no disputed facts, seeking a final ruling,

7. A Default Judgment is when a Defendant fails to submit a complaint, and "failure to include the necessary information is grounds for the [plaintiff] to request the presiding judge to grant default judgment." [Emphasis added],

8. The Plaintiff in that case did not request Default Judgment,

9. The Plaintiff in that case did specifically request Summary Judgment, as the Defendant's failure to contest any claims meant as a matter of law the Plaintiff was entitled to Summary Judgment, and

10. Opposing counsel has used their previous station as a Judge to improperly re-interpret their own previous rulings to argue and attempt to benefit in this case, therefore,

Opposing counsel, subconsciously or otherwise, has improperly used their previous rulings as a Judge to re-interpret or ex post facto (ruling after the fact) say their previous decision as a Judge meant something it very clearly does not.

The Plaintiff is extremely worried that, even if this was a mistake done in good faith, it could be done again on a more serious matter, in another case, or by a future bad actor that would seek to allow the spectre of their previous experience on the bench to manipulate the law as they so chose after leaving the bench.

This is further compounded by opposing counsel's point late in § 14 where they state: "Also NOTE that the Judge spoke publicly on the matter later, explaining that some of the punitive damages were because “the Defense [didn’t] show up” [see Exhibit D-001]."

Even if opposing counsel's assertion is correct, in good faith, and entirely truthful, it cannot be denied that allowing this sort of behavior to occur is irreconcilable with the duties of a Judicial Officer.

If I could serve on the bench, make rulings, and then later in private practice "interpret" my own rulings in any way I pleased, it would be quite difficult to say I was wrong, as only I, the judge in that case, truly knew what I was thinking upon the making of the ruling, and saying otherwise is a daunting—not to mention unfalsifiable—proposition.

The Plaintiff requests that the learned and Honorable Judge in this case take a stand against this potential flaw in our justice system. In two separate instances, within the same point, opposing counsel either changed/misrepresented a previous ruling, or improperly interpreted his own ruling to his client's benefit. This could surely be in good faith and an honest mistake—but it makes no sense to allow this kind of behavior.

The Plaintiff humbly requests opposing counsel in this case be dismissed, any benefits conferred upon opposing counsel by the Defense be remitted, and the Defense being granted a reasonable amount of time to search for new counsel.

May we respond?

 

[juniperfig]

May we respond?

You may.

 

[juniperfig]

Discovery is now closed. The Plaintiff has 72 hours to submit an opening statement.

 

[Dartanboy]

You may.

On The Content of the Motion
1. While much of the facts in the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider are true, #7 is misleading. Although a Default Judgement may be requested by a Plaintiff, it is not required -- the quote says that something could be grounds to request it, but does not specify that this is the only way to achieve a Default Judgement.

2. In regards to "Opposing counsel has used their previous station as a Judge to improperly re-interpret their own previous rulings to argue and attempt to benefit in this case," I put forward simply that I'm not re-interpreting it, as this was the meaning the whole time.

But, regardless of this, as I am not a Judicial Officer, it matters not what my interpretation is, your honor. As the Learned and Honorable Judge Juniperfig, it is now your responsibility to interpret the law - including my previous verdict - and what I say it means is just the persuasion of an Attorney, as is anything Mr. Fries can say.

On The Federal Court's Powers and Responsibilities
When seeking to uncover the powers and responsibilities of the Federal Court, we look to the Constitution - the highest law in Redmont. In particular, we look at Part 2, Section 18 - "Powers of the Federal Court."

Section 18 is quoted:

18. Powers‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Federal Court
(1) Original Jurisdiction. The‌ ‌Federal ‌Court‌ ‌of‌ ‌Redmont‌ ‌has original jurisdiction over‌:

(a) Questions of constitutionality,
(b) Major ‌criminal‌ ‌prosecutions‌ ‌that‌ ‌result‌ ‌in‌ ‌jail‌ ‌exceeding‌ ‌60 minutes‌ ‌or‌ ‌$10,000 dollars‌ ‌of‌ ‌fines,
(c) Major ‌civil‌ ‌cases‌ ‌whose‌ ‌value‌ exceeds $50,000 dollars,
(d) Any cases of significance that do not fit within the established bounds of court jurisdictions.
(e) Serving as the appellate court for the District Court
(f) Issuing warrants
(g) Requiring legal representation for parties appearing before the Court
(h) Assuming the responsibilities of District and Federal Courts when necessary.

Nowhere does the power exist to remove a legally-qualified Attorney from representing a client in the Federal Court, and according to the long-standing precedent of the Honorable Former Justice BananaNova in [2022] FCR 97, the Government's powers are strictly limited to those which are found in the Constitution.

FCR 97 - Lawsuit: Adjourned - Dartanman v. Commonwealth of Redmont [2022] FCR 97

Final Notes
I cannot pretend to understand why Mr. Fries is dead-set on getting me removed from this lawsuit, but it seems clear to me that he is creating an appeal to emotions, rather than making plain the law. Is it morally dubious for me to represent Blazora just weeks after ruling against them? I don't feel qualified to make a claim such as that, but what I am certain of is that the law not only doesn't allow my removal from this case, it actually prohibits it.

 

[Avaneesh2008]

Your honor,

On behalf of The Exchange, I would like to make an Amicus Brief regarding the bond's status on the platform.

 

[juniperfig]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

The Plaintiff has raised a compelling ethical question—one that I believe deserves careful consideration. In short: I believe the harm caused by removing Dartanman from this case exceeds the harm caused by allowing him to stay, and I will hereby be denying the motion to reconsider.

In an ideal world, I would agree with Smallfries’s concerns. There is something unsettling about a judge-turned-attorney leveraging their prior rulings in litigation, particularly when those rulings are being (allegedly) reinterpreted to benefit their current client. Smallfries’s argument—

If I could serve on the bench, make rulings, and then later in private practice "interpret" my own rulings in any way I pleased, it would be quite difficult to say I was wrong, as only I, the judge in that case, truly knew what I was thinking upon the making of the ruling, and saying otherwise is a daunting—not to mention unfalsifiable—proposition.

—is very persuasive. And Dartanman’s rebuttal, stating “I put forward simply that I'm not re-interpreting it, as this was the meaning the whole time”, only underscores the problem at hand. Once a Judicial Officer leaves the bench, their rulings (in theory) stand on their own, subject only to the Court’s interpretation. In practice, it’s undeniably harder to reject an attorney’s argument when that attorney was the judge who wrote the ruling in question.

Yet the law does not support removal here.

The Constitution grants no authority to disqualify counsel on these grounds, and neither does any other law that I am able to find. [2022] FCR 97 reinforces that courts cannot assume powers beyond those explicitly granted. Additionally, I believe the practical consequences of such a ruling would be severe.

The legal community in DC is small. Talent is scarce. Judges become attorneys; attorneys become judges, around and around, over and over again. If we barred every lawyer who once ruled on a related matter, we would cripple an already strained system.

This precedent doesn’t exactly apply here, but I’d like to point to this ruling (funnily enough, Dartanman’s) in Commonwealth of Redmont v. xLayzur [2024] SCR 1.

It is, frankly, impossible to find an active player in the legal field who has not had either a positive or negative interaction with former President xLayzur, seeing as Redmont is not a large country, and the entire legal field is closely tied to the Executive Branch. For this reason, the concept of an Appearance of Bias must be different when applying to, for lack of a better word, celebrities.

…

Such behavior would not be allowed on the Court, and if Mr. End had been a Justice when he made those comments, he would certainly be recused. But, he did not make those comments on the bench - they were made nearly half a year prior to his nomination.

Now as a member of the Supreme Court, the very same set of facts is closely examined through the lens of the Constitution and the law - one which sees only in black and white, that applies the highest level of scrutiny to all facts and evidence in order to fairly judge the case on its merit alone, without bias.

This is an unfortunate flaw of our legal system. Law is difficult. It has a steep learning curve, it is quite thankless, and therefore the community is very tight-knit. We must operate on good faith for the health of the system, trusting that professionals, whether on the bench or at the bar, will uphold their duties with integrity.

The Defence has chosen him as their representative. I lack both the legal authority and moral certainty to override that choice. The Plaintiff’s concerns are valid, but the remedy they seek is untenable. Again, for the final time, the motion to reconsider is denied.

 

[Smallfries]

Discovery is now closed. The Plaintiff has 72 hours to submit an opening statement.

The Plaintiff requests a forty-eight hour extension due to extenuating personal circumstances.

 

[juniperfig]

The Plaintiff requests a forty-eight hour extension due to extenuating personal circumstances.

Granted.

 

[juniperfig]

Your honor,

On behalf of The Exchange, I would like to make an Amicus Brief regarding the bond's status on the platform.

You may.

 

[Avaneesh2008]

Brief

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
AMICUS BRIEF

Your honor,
The Exchange has recently paid out bondholders of the BZ24-6m bond by Blazora on March 27th at 9:06 pm PST. We wish to clarify the timeline on the payment for the courts information regarding this decision.

March 20th, 2025: Nexalin asked the Exchange to pay out $1,070,000 to cover both the face value of the bond and 1 month worth of interest.

March 27th, 2025: Avaneesh2008 actioned out the distribution and paid out the bond + 1 month of interest to bondholders as well as delisting the said bond.

Specifically, Megaminerm has been paid out $278,628.00 in the following breakdown:
$260,400 - Maturity of the Bond
$18,228 - 1 month of interest

We request the court and parties to take this information into consideration when further deliberating this case. We thank the court for their time.

 

[Dartanboy]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defense petitions the court to dismiss this case, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

Under Rule 5.5 - Lack of Claim
As the Plaintiff has now been paid, the lawsuit has no claim.

 

[Smallfries]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defense petitions the court to dismiss this case, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

Under Rule 5.5 - Lack of Claim
As the Plaintiff has now been paid, the lawsuit has no claim.

Your honor,

The Plaintiff has a response, but asks to withhold judgment until the opening statement for the Plaintiff is made, which should suffice as a response.

 

[juniperfig]

Your honor,

The Plaintiff has a response, but asks to withhold judgment until the opening statement for the Plaintiff is made, which should suffice as a response.

Understood. I see no reason to deny this request, so I will withhold judgement on the MTD until the opening statement is submitted.

 

[Smallfries]

Opening Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OPENING STATEMENT

May it please the court,

My name is Smallfries and I represent the Plaintiff, MegaMinerM. The case before the court today is one of immense importance for the finance sector in Redmont, and should not be taken lightly. Intense and honest scrutiny must be applied, and it is with this in mind that the Plaintiff humbly presents itself to the court.

1. MANY OF THE FACTS ARE NOT IN CONTENTION, AND THOSE THAT THE DEFENDANT SEEMS TO BE UNSURE ABOUT ARE EASILY PROVEN

There are three broad areas to touch on regarding the defendant’s answer: The facts in agreement, the facts the defendant seems to be unsure of, and the facts in contention.

2. THE DEFENDANT CONCEDES TO MOST OF THE PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL FOUNDATION

The defense agrees that the MegaMinerM purchased over a quarter million dollars in shares. They affirm that Nexalin was contacted several times, and that payment was not completed until long after those attempts at contact. They affirm that again Nexalin was contacted through an attempted conference, but he did not attempt to directly address the plaintiff’s concerns in that case.

They affirm that the hidden terms of the agreement were revealed months after the bond was released and the contract for the bonds were already made. They affirm that a vote was called to allegedly extend the bond date for six months, with no other stated terms. They affirm that a suit was filed. They affirm that the plaintiff in that case won on almost all of the merits, and that the defendant in that case didn’t even show up.

They affirm that two days after Nexalin’s loss in that case, Nexalin unceremoniously called the bond, a day before the end of the month of February. They affirm that on March 8, 2025, the Plaintiff in this case publicly attempted to get Nexalin’s attention to pay the now more than a week-delayed payments.

There are, however, issues at hand. The defense seems unsure whether at several points, the plaintiff in lcn v. Blazora Corporation received their duly owed interest payments. They are unsure if statements made on behalf of Nexalin/Blazora corporation were made at their request. They are unsure if the vote called to increase the length of the payments to mid-summer were done at Blazora’s request.

3. THE DEFENDANT SEEMS UNSURE OF SOME FACTS, BUT THIS IS EASILY OVERCOME BY A BRIEF GLANCE AT THE EVIDENCE

They are unsure if Blazora (then Easy Corporation) requested the Exchange announce their name change, unsure if there was a breach of contract in that case, unsure if there was any overdue interest at the time of filing of that case, unsure if Nexalin, when confronted with his breaching conduct, instead negligently left the discord, and unsure if no additional interest has been paid past the second payment made.

It is the duty of an attorney to be well-informed of the case on hand, and so I feel it is my sacred obligation to help opposing counsel to be sure of things here.

1. When lcn asked for payment on November 5th, interest was not paid. It would not be paid until almost two months later. This is clear as the record states, and because lcn did not receive their payments at this time, neither did the Plaintiff here.

2. Similar to above, interest was not paid in October or November. The record clearly reflects this, and it seems quite creative to suggest otherwise.

3. It is ridiculous to claim that the Exchange made an announcement on the behalf of Easy Corporation/Blazora Corporation without the latter’s consent.

a. It is equally if not more ridiculous to suggest they did so several times without Blazora seeming to care.

b. It is even more ridiculous to think that the Exchange made several of these announcements over just as many months, of such vital concern to Easy/Blazora Corporation, seemingly without Easy/Blazora Corporation’s approval.

c. It is extraordinarily ridiculous to say all of the above with the ruling that opposing counsel made in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, where the learned judge there ruled the defendant in that case was civilly liable for misrepresentation, fraud, false advertising, and misleading advertising, all connected to the statements above.

i. Whether opposing counsel is misinterpreting his own rulings from a previous case for his benefit or simply making up arguments in a desperate attempt to shield the Defendant’s indefensible acts is unclear.

4. The rest of the moments where the defense seems unsure about statements made apply as above. We assure the court that the statements were made, they were surely made on the defendant’s behalf and with their consent, and that they have already been ruled on. As a matter of law, stare decisis must inform the court’s decision on that respect, due to this case originating from the same misconduct in that case.

5. There was a breach of contract. To say otherwise is a clear and wilful misrepresentation of that facts, not to mention previous rulings by opposing counsel in lcn v. Blazora Corporation. The learned judge in that case—now opposing counsel—said that there was “no doubt that an offering of any bond constitutes a contract when accepted . . . certainly the failure [to pay off the bond and its interest] is a Breach of Contract.” Stare decisis applies due to this case originating from the same misconduct in that case.

6. There was surely overdue interest. As noted in both points above, lcn v. Blazora Corporation held that at the time of the bond’s the attempted negotiation between lcn and Nexalin two interest payments were made, and the bondholders only received two. As a matter of law, at least one interest payment was due. At the time of filing of this case, that interest payment had not been made to bondholders as a class.
7. It is abundantly clear in the record that at the time of filing, only two interest payments had been made. The defendant paid for the first two months—October and November—and owed interest for the entirety of December (which opposing counsel agreed with and made Nexalin pay lcn in that case, and which MegaMinerM had not benefited from) and January.

a. The defendant further waited until the day before February to cancel the bond in a clear attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the public, defendant’s investors, and this honored court. But the court will not be deceived by this duplicitous action; the judge’s holding in lcn v. Blazora Corporation found that “if the bond’s terms require interest to be paid every month, it must certainly be paid out every month.” [Emphasis added] Opposing counsel’s deliberate misinterpretation or convenient amnesia of his own opinion here stands in stark contrast to the facts.

The Plaintiff hopes the above is a helpful reminder of the facts as they stand, and serves to clear up any deliberate or otherwise unnecessary confusion introduced by the defense, and welcomes further questions from the bench.

4. THE DEFENSE DISCLAIMS SOME FACTS, BUT THESE ARE EASILY OVERTURNED BY A LOOK AT THE RECORD AND A BASIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, JUSTICE, AND COMMON SENSE

There are two facts in contention here:

1. That lcn v. Blazora Corporation was decided via a Summary Judgment, and

2. That defendant had a right to call the bond as he did on the 27th of February.

These are both easily resolvable. First, it as a matter of fact the judge (opposing counsel) in that case did grant Summary Judgment. After the defendant in that case said they were present, they failed to disagree with any of the facts brought up by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then moved for summary judgment alone, stating that:

“The lack of an answer means there are no denials of any of the Plaintiff’s allegations or facts. The lack of denial means there are no facts in dispute. As there are no facts in dispute, as a matter of law the Court should direct the verdict for the Plaintiff.”

lcn v. Blazora Corporation. The judge then granted that request, saying “This court is now in recess until Summary Judgment is delivered.” The defendant in that case had six whole days to say anything or attempt to appeal, but did not. After the verdict was delivered for the plaintiff, the defendant never attempted to appeal the case.

Opposing counsel attempts to muddy the waters by bringing up definitions, but two can play at that game. Default judgment is: when “[a party fails] to include the necessary information[, which] is grounds for plaintiffs to request the presiding judge to grant default judgment.” This does not say that a judge may grant default judgment on their own. It also does not say that a judge must grant default judgment, whether a plaintiff moves for it or not. Simply that a plaintiff may request it.

In contrast, Summary Judgment is when a plaintiff requests a judge to make a decision before trial when no facts are in dispute. The plaintiff alleged facts, the defendant did not dispute them. The plaintiff pointed this out and the judge agreed, so much so that he wrote an entire opinion going through each alleged offense and agreeing with all of them.

In this case, opposing counsel said that the Summary Judgment rightfully granted in that case should have instead been a default judgment, because the party in question did not appear, vs. a Summary Judgment where the parties both agree on the facts.

It is plain as day that the plaintiff in that case was seeking a Summary Judgment. The judge in that case echoed that desire, and then granted it. To attempt to say that instead it was a default judgment is clearly wrong, because the judge in that case—opposing counsel here—went through and granted each of the claims as fact due to the defense not denying them. If this case were to be default judgment, the judge would not have wasted time writing up his opinion, nor would he have wasted time asking the plaintiff there for explanation over one of his alleged offenses, nor would the judge have denied one small portion of the alleged damages. As a matter of law, the judge in that case granted Summary Judgment, and there it shall stay.

As to the second point, the defendant did indeed create a new contract. This contract exists because the original contract did not have a provision whereby a modification of the contract could be made. Even if it did, not every bondholder agreed to the alleged modification (two bondholders voted against). They could not be held bound to a modification they never agreed to.

Instead, a new contract was created because as a class the bondholders continued to hold the bonds when the proposal was put into place, indicating silence by acceptance. This new contract did not have any of the terms included in the first contract, nor did it modify the first contract except for the fact that the bond would continue until mid-summer.

With these contentions swatted down, there are no more disputes in the facts, and we can move on to the defense’s attempt to defend against the Plaintiff’s allegations.

5. THE DEFENSE’S NEW ARGUMENTS ARE SEE-THROUGH AND WILL NOT SURVIVE SCRUTINY

The defense has three arguments:

1. The vote created a modified contract, and when that contract was called (as they alleged it still could be) it only owed its holders the principal amount and the amount of interest for November, December, and January.

2. That amount was still in the exchange, and it was not the Defendant’s fault in any way that it was not in the Plaintiff’s hands.

3. The Plaintiff is suing because the Exchange is the ones that actually posted, not the Defendant.

These are easily dismissed.

Point one is addressed directly in the latter half of section four. A new contract was created, and it did not have the term that the bond could be called early. Further, it is a factual inaccuracy—and another eyebrow-raising misrepresentation—that the only months owed were for the months of November, December, and January. The case preceding this one held that as of the bond’s maturity date, January 1, two interest payments had been made and one was owed. Those months would be October, November, and December. The opposing counsel knows this for a fact, but chose to misrepresent their previous ruling anyways.

Further, the Defendant “called” one day before the month of February concluded. This was a clear attempt to suck as much time as the Defendant could from innocent investors, and should not be rewarded. The moment a month ticks over, interest for that full month must be owed to prevent fraud. Finally, the Plaintiff’s principal was not returned until March 27, 2025. Until that time, the Defendant was able to not pay out any investors and keep the money. If the court does not hold that the Defendant owes the plaintiff interest for the full month of February and for at least 27 days of the month of March, then the court will be punishing future investors who may innocently invest in a project, only for a bad-faith debtor to call their investment and drag their feet, holding the amount in principal interest-free. This cannot stand.

Point two is similarly tossed aside, ironically thanks to the Defendant’s own help. An amicus brief filed by Avaneesh2008 on behalf of The Exchange notes that on March 20th, 2025, “Nexalin asked The Exchange to pay [to cover] both the face value of the bond and one month [sic] worth of interest.” Opposing counsel seems to agree with this fact, as he did not object to anything stated, and decided to try to say that the Plaintiff in this case has no more standing.

In helpfully giving the timeline for when Nexalin truly tried to pay back the money, opposing counsel has made a critical error. The eagle-eyed court watcher will notice that the date Nexalin asked The Exchange to pay back his investors—almost a month after officially calling the bond—coincided with the same day that opposing counsel declared its representation for Nexalin.

The timeline must be remembered here; Nexalin lost his case against lcn on February 25. Nexalin called the bond on February 27. MegaMinerM asked for his money on March 8. This lawsuit was filed on March 17. Nexalin retained the judge of the previous case as counsel on March 20. Nexalin asked The Exchange, for the first time, to pay investors back on March 20.

This is not a coincidence. It is also not ethical, and it is not moral. It is clear as the magnifying glass in my profile picture that the Defendant in this case, pleading that it was instead the victim of The Exchange’s failure to get the money out to the people, was lying. The Defendant did not even try until the threat of a lawsuit hung over his head. For this reason, point two must be discarded, as if the Defendant had attempted to return the money to the Plaintiff the day (or even the week) of the bond being called, it would have returned in a timely manner. In addition, if the Defendant wants to blame The Exchange, they must sue The Exchange and prove they caused the damages, instead of waving around vague accusations of blame. It is not the Plaintiff’s fault that the negligence of the Defendant may have been augmented by that of a third party—that is what third party cross-claims are for.

Point three is the weakest of all the points. The language of many of the punitive claims says “authorizing.” It is unreasonable to think The Exchange was posting various informational releases without the Defendant’s authorization, and opposing counsel recognized and agreed with this fact when he ruled against the Defendant in the previous case.

Further, again, if Defendant truly believed his assertion correct he would sue The Exchange during this case in order to reclaim partial or whole damages the Defendant is ruled liable here for. In not doing so, Defendant plainly admits his desire to see this case tossed out and hoping that The Exchange is likewise shielded, so that the Defendant’s wrongdoings and The Exchange's alleged (by the Defendant’s) wrongdoings will go unpunished.

The court cannot allow this to pass, and must not diminish liability for the Defendant. If the Defendant truly believes that The Exchange should be held liable for the damages wrought in this case, they should put their money where their mouth is. It is not up to the Plaintiff to combat wrongs on the behalf of the Defendant.

6. THE MOTION TO DISMISS HAS NO BACKING, THE CLAIM HAS NOT BEEN EVEN PARTIALLY DISTURBED

As explained above, the motion to dismiss is toothless. Even if it could be fathomed that the claim on the principal value of the bond and one interest payment should be disclaimed (more on that later), the case still relies upon a wealth of punitive damages from the horrendous conduct of the Defendant, the interest payment for the entire month of January, the interest payment for the entire month of February, and the interest for the money held up until the 27th of March.

Further, it is clear that the punitive damages have finally convinced the Defendant to take his fraudulent behavior seriously. The defendant, as opposing counsel notes in the dicta of his opinion, disappointingly did not even bother to properly defend his first case. He seemed to have taken it as a cost of business and moved on. The Plaintiff here, worried about the justice for future investors, decided to up the amount on the punitive damages, both as a reflection of how much more is at stake (monetary wise, as he has much more money invested than lcn in that case) and how Nexalin continued his depraved actions despite being slapped with a heavy fine.

It is telling that the Defendant has finally retained counsel—the judge of his old case, no less. It is telling that Defendant has tried to undercut the Plaintiff by (eventually) paying back (part of) the money the Defendant unjustly kept. It is telling that the Defendant has attempted to use all of these tricks, but they will all fail.

The Plaintiff humbly asks the court this: do not reward the Defendant’s despicable actions. These duplicitous, anti-social, and untrustworthy acts of fraudulent behavior such as calling a bond one day before he believed new interest would be due to evade it, keeping the principal of that interest for nearly a month interest-free, and then trying to fess up and return the stolen money when threatened with legal action in an attempt to try to lower the fees he will inevitably pay cannot be rewarded.

In considering your damage awards, do not reduce any of the compensatory damages, particularly the $260,400 figure. The Plaintiff urges the court not to remove this figure but instead to credit the mid-case payment after rendering the decision. The Defendant here clearly wants to try to mitigate fees they pay by “fixing” damage done after the fact. A thief cannot return a precious gem he has stolen in the middle of his trial and force the government to lower his prison sentence; so too should the court not reward this “Oops, I got caught!” behavior.

In closing, none of the requested damages should be removed or diminished, as they were true when the case was filed and the Defendant should not be rewarded for only changing their behavior when they were caught. Further, the case should not be dismissed because there are still many claims on the board: by Plaintiff’s math, nearly two million of them. Finally, none of the defenses opposing counsel summons are able to overcome the evidence presented—nor can the Defendant overcome common decency. The Plaintiff requests a speedy and just verdict in this matter.

Thank you for your consideration. I yield the remaining time.

 

[juniperfig]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION TO DISMISS

The Defense petitions the court to dismiss this case, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

Under Rule 5.5 - Lack of Claim
As the Plaintiff has now been paid, the lawsuit has no claim.

This motion has been denied. Partial repayment does not extinguish the Plaintiff’s claims, particularly those involving punitive damages and delayed interest.

The Defence has 72 hours to submit their opening statement.

 

[Smallfries]

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff moves that the Plaintiff in this case be granted summary judgment, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. The Defendant has had 80 hours to file an opening statement,

2. The Defendant has failed to file an opening statement,

3. The Plaintiff has conclusively disproven the Defendant's assertions regarding the facts in controversy,

4. There are no facts in controversy,

5. The merits of this case are backed up by common sense and precedent through lcn v. Blazora Corporation,

6. The Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and to be granted all relief listed in the original complaint above.

 

[Dartanboy]

Your honor, I sincerely apologize for being late. If you don't allow an Opening Statement, I understand, but I hope you will allow just 12 hours to submit one. This is completely my mistake, but I honestly got confused with the Opening Statement being simultaneously an answer to a Motion, which is quite an odd situation.

Regardless, even if you choose not to allow an Opening Statement, Summary Judgement is not permissible as facts are in dispute.

 

[Smallfries]

Your honor, I sincerely apologize for being late. If you don't allow an Opening Statement, I understand, but I hope you will allow just 12 hours to submit one. This is completely my mistake, but I honestly got confused with the Opening Statement being simultaneously an answer to a Motion, which is quite an odd situation.

Regardless, even if you choose not to allow an Opening Statement, Summary Judgement is not permissible as facts are in dispute.

Your honor, the defense simply saying "we still dispute this" does not mean it truly is in dispute. The Plaintiff believes they have conclusively proven their point, and would like summary judgment in order to not waste the court's precious time.

 

[Dartanboy]

Your honor, I sincerely apologize for being late. If you don't allow an Opening Statement, I understand, but I hope you will allow just 12 hours to submit one. This is completely my mistake, but I honestly got confused with the Opening Statement being simultaneously an answer to a Motion, which is quite an odd situation.

Regardless, even if you choose not to allow an Opening Statement, Summary Judgement is not permissible as facts are in dispute.

Additionally, your honor, my client is afforded the right to a fair trial. If their counsel drops the ball, as I did, the counsel should be held in Contempt but this should not be an excuse to punish my client and create an unfair trial.

 

[Dartanboy]

Your honor, the defense simply saying "we still dispute this" does not mean it truly is in dispute. The Plaintiff believes they have conclusively proven their point, and would like summary judgment in order to not waste the court's precious time.

I won't keep responding so informally, but your honor, if you allow an Opening Statement I can show how the Plaintiff has not proved the disputed facts conclusively.

 

[Smallfries]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Respectfully, your honor,

Opposing counsel's continued breach of procedure with constant informal dialogue provides unhelpful and cluttering messages that do nothing to further justice in this matter.

Further, requesting an extension is perfectly reasonable and acceptable, but only before a date's lapsing. It is the defense's duty both on the counsel side to keep track of their due dates, and on the client side to keep up with the goings-on of their hired counsel.

Due dates are set for a reason. The Court should not allow them to be handwaved off with a warning or a simple fine. If you do not respect the court's (and the opposing party's) time, you should not be given a hand slap. Due dates must be respected in the interest of time, or else our legal system will fall apart.

 

[Dartanboy]

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Respectfully, your honor,

Opposing counsel's continued breach of procedure with constant informal dialogue provides unhelpful and cluttering messages that do nothing to further justice in this matter.

Further, requesting an extension is perfectly reasonable and acceptable, but only before a date's lapsing. It is the defense's duty both on the counsel side to keep track of their due dates, and on the client side to keep up with the goings-on of their hired counsel.

Due dates are set for a reason. The Court should not allow them to be handwaved off with a warning or a simple fine. If you do not respect the court's (and the opposing party's) time, you should not be given a hand slap. Due dates must be respected in the interest of time, or else our legal system will fall apart.

Your honor, we have both made informal statements. You can choose to ignore and strike on technicalities, or you could seek to preserve the fundamental principles of truth and justice.

Regardless, this is a response to an Objection, which is permitted, so I'll address the points in the Objection.

Yes, it is unacceptable to be late in court, which is precisely why the law exists to charge people with Contempt of Court. Smallfries is asking you to be unjust, and end the case due to a minor error. I am asking you, as a Learned and Honorable Judge, to uphold my client's Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial.

I accept responsibility for my actions, while the opposing counsel seeks to sow the seeds of chaos to win a quick buck for him and his client, under the guise of fairness.

I ask you, your honor, what is more important, will you be abruptly ending a case on the whim of a biased attorney, or be upholding the rights enshrined in Part IV of our Constitution?

 

[juniperfig]

Stop bickering. You both know better than this. Keep your petty feud out of this court thread. This will serve a warning for both sides—if either of you continue to speak unprompted, I will hold you in contempt.

Dartanboy, I will grant you the requested 12 hours to file your Opening Statement. The confusion is understandable. If you miss this deadline, I will hold you in contempt.

Motion

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff moves that the Plaintiff in this case be granted summary judgment, and in support thereof, respectfully alleges:

1. The Defendant has had 80 hours to file an opening statement,

2. The Defendant has failed to file an opening statement,

3. The Plaintiff has conclusively disproven the Defendant's assertions regarding the facts in controversy,

4. There are no facts in controversy,

5. The merits of this case are backed up by common sense and precedent through lcn v. Blazora Corporation,

6. The Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and to be granted all relief listed in the original complaint above.

This motion is denied. The facts are still in dispute.

Objection

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OBJECTION - BREACH OF PROCEDURE

Respectfully, your honor,

Opposing counsel's continued breach of procedure with constant informal dialogue provides unhelpful and cluttering messages that do nothing to further justice in this matter.

Further, requesting an extension is perfectly reasonable and acceptable, but only before a date's lapsing. It is the defense's duty both on the counsel side to keep track of their due dates, and on the client side to keep up with the goings-on of their hired counsel.

Due dates are set for a reason. The Court should not allow them to be handwaved off with a warning or a simple fine. If you do not respect the court's (and the opposing party's) time, you should not be given a hand slap. Due dates must be respected in the interest of time, or else our legal system will fall apart.

Objection sustained. All unprompted statements will be struck.

Again, the Defence has approximately 7.5 hours remaining to submit their Opening Statement.

 

[Dartanboy]

Opening Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
OPENING STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION
Your honor, this case is a simple one. The Plaintiff attempted to distort reality and convince you that somehow my client is liable for some nearly non-existent damages. Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the facts show an entirely different story. In this Opening Statement, I will establish the following:

• Even if my client is liable, the requested damages are grossly disproportionate.
• The much smaller amount of actual damages were not caused by Blazora Corporation.

Regarding The Precedent Of [2025] FCR 18
The Defendant failed to produce any arguments, and thus, the Federal Court had only heard a one-sided argument. It is certainly possible that the Federal Court could have been persuaded otherwise if the Defendant had mounted a defense of some kind.

Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between the current case and lcn’s. In particular, lcn refused to agree to modify the terms of the contract where the Plaintiff in this case (MegaMinerM) actually agreed (see Exhibit P-007). This is an extremely important difference to note.

On The Non-Affirmed Yet Non-Denied Facts
The Plaintiff claims, “They are unsure if Blazora (then Easy Corporation) requested the Exchange announce their name change, unsure if there was a breach of contract in that case, unsure if there was any overdue interest at the time of filing of that case, unsure if Nexalin, when confronted with his breaching conduct, instead negligently left the discord, and unsure if no additional interest has been paid past the second payment made.”

The Defense neither affirms nor denies the claim that we are “unsure.” We simply refused to affirm or deny those particular alleged Facts of the case.

Now, let’s consider these non-affirmed yet non-denied Facts:

1. It was established that “an announcement from Exchange CEO Stoppers said that Easy Corporation “Has been taking aggressive steps to prepare for launch,” and they “Plan[ned] to launch by summer 2025.”” however – it was neither affirmed or denied “that this was done at the behest of Nexalin and/or Blazora Corporation.”

The Plaintiff boldly claimed in their Opening Statement that “It is ridiculous to claim that the Exchange made an announcement on the behalf of Easy Corporation/Blazora Corporation without the latter’s consent.”

However, the Defense proposes an alternative and entirely plausible situation: Someone familiar with the situation of Easy Corporation renaming itself, perhaps Nexalin or another individual, informed The Exchange of this event, and then The Exchange opted to make an announcement without Blazora Corporation’s knowledge and/or consent.

The same or similar situation could have occurred for any subset of the announcements.

2. The Plaintiff claims, “There was a breach of contract. To say otherwise is a clear and wilful misrepresentation of that facts, not to mention previous rulings by opposing counsel in lcn v. Blazora Corporation. The learned judge in that case—now opposing counsel—said that there was “no doubt that an offering of any bond constitutes a contract when accepted . . . certainly the failure [to pay off the bond and its interest] is a Breach of Contract.” Stare decisis applies due to this case originating from the same misconduct in that case.”

While the Defense affirms there was a contract, the Defense also contends that the contract was modified by MegaMinerM accepting the change in Exhibit P-007. Certainly it is also true that if my client had failed to pay off the bond and its interest, it would be a Breach of Contract, however, it is clear from the Facts and Amicus Brief from The Exchange that it was paid in full.

3. The Plaintiff claims, “There was surely overdue interest. As noted in both points above, lcn v. Blazora Corporation held that at the time of the bond’s the attempted negotiation between lcn and Nexalin two interest payments were made, and the bondholders only received two. As a matter of law, at least one interest payment was due. At the time of filing of this case, that interest payment had not been made to bondholders as a class.”

The Defense sees no reason to deny the fact that there was overdue interest, however it is clear that this is not a fault of Blazora, as will be explained later.

Furthermore, we stress the point that after the case was filed, the interest was paid out.

4. The Plaintiff claims “It is abundantly clear in the record that at the time of filing, only two interest payments had been made. The defendant paid for the first two months—October and November—and owed interest for the entirety of December (which opposing counsel agreed with and made Nexalin pay lcn in that case, and which MegaMinerM had not benefited from) and January.”

However, the Defense denies this claim, as Exhibit P-006 assuredly shows that no interest was due for October, and the interest payments made were for November and December, and then owed interest for January.

While the verdict of [2025] FCR 18 says, “To the Plaintiff, there was not even the slightest indication that there would not be any interest paid for the month of October,” which was a key point to the case, it is worth noting this is actually not the fault of Blazora Corporation, as shown in Exhibit P-008, this was a miscommunication caused by The Exchange, and The Exchange “takes full responsibility for any inconvenience caused by [The Exchange’s] failure to adequately communicate these terms …”

5. The Plaintiff also claims, “The defendant further waited until the day before February to cancel the bond in a clear attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the public, defendant’s investors, and this honored court. But the court will not be deceived by this duplicitous action; the judge’s holding in lcn v. Blazora Corporation found that “if the bond’s terms require interest to be paid every month, it must certainly be paid out every month.” Opposing counsel’s deliberate misinterpretation or convenient amnesia of his own opinion here stands in stark contrast to the facts.”

The Defense simply puts forward the following fact: 27 days of February is not a month. The month of February had not happened before this bond was called, and thus, no interest was due for February.

On The Denied Facts
As the Plaintiff has claimed, there are two facts in contention:

1. That lcn v. Blazora Corporation was decided via a Summary Judgment, and

2. That defendant had a right to call the bond as he did on the 27th of February.

The Defense continues to assert that the Plaintiff is misunderstanding the concept of a Summary Judgement, which requires not only all facts to be not disputed, but “It seeks a final ruling on the case based on agreed material facts” [emphasis added] (see Guide - Motions). Since the Defendant did not pose any affirmation nor denial of any Facts, they were not agreed upon and thus, Summary Judgement could not have occurred. It was simply a mislabeled Default Judgement.

As far as the right to call the bond, it is clear in Exhibit P-006 that the bond was callable on or after January 1, 2025. The modification in Exhibit P-007 clearly says it would extend the bond’s term, not produce a new bond or contract. The original contract did not need to have a provision for a modification, as modification is always allowed by mutual agreement, through Implied Terms established by conduct of the parties (offer and agreement of the extension) (see Act of Congress - Contracts Act, Section 5).

On The Plaintiff’s “Rebuttal” To Our Arguments
The Plaintiff contends that the vote created a new contract, however the wording of the modification, the Contracts Act, and the actions of both parties show that this was a modification to the original contract, and not an entirely new one. This preserves the bond’s callability and to suggest otherwise is nothing more than an attempt to greedily make extra money in a case where Blazora Corporation has already met all of their obligations to pay interest, literally giving money to the Plaintiff already.

The Plaintiff also claims that because Nexalin asked The Exchange to pay out the bond and interest on March 20th, this somehow makes Blazora Corporation liable for it being late, however as shown in Exhibit P-008, the bond was called on February 27th, and this was announced by The Exchange. Nexalin and Blazora Corporation understandably believed The Exchange was then going to do what it said it would do: “Bondholders will be paid all interest due to-date along with the bond’s principal.” On March 20th, this was at least the second time this was requested, not the first. The Exchange dropped the ball here, not Blazora.

Finally, the Plaintiff claims that it is “unreasonable to think The Exchange was posting various informational releases without the Defendant’s authorization” but this is not true. First of all, it is not unreasonable to believe this, but furthermore, even if it is true, The Exchange admitted to miscommunicating these announcements in Exhibit P-008. This is not the fault of Blazora Corporation.

The Plaintiff also boldly suggested that Blazora should sue The Exchange for these damages, however Blazora was not damaged by these events – only the Plaintiff allegedly was damaged.

On Grossly Disproportionate Damages
1. Even assuming there were three months’ of missing interest (which there were not), there is no evidence that the Plaintiff would make 7% interest on the interest. Thus, Prayer for Relief 1 should be ignored or diminuted on this point alone.

Nonetheless, we also stress that there was only interest required for January, and while late, it was paid out in late March (although it was requested as far back as February 27th). Thus, Prayer for Relief 1 should be entirely ignored.

2. The calling of the bond was not a Breach of Contract, as this was a modification of the original contract which included calling the bond as an option. There was a miscommunication of these terms by The Exchange, but this is not the fault of Blazora. Thus, Prayer for Relief 2 should be entirely ignored.

3. The $260,400 was paid back in late March. Albeit late, to require the Defendant to pay it back a second time would be theft, and would actually set the precedent that those who are late on payments should never make payments, and simply invest the money and pay back the principal later, after a court case. Thus, Prayer for Relief 3 should be entirely ignored.

4. Any Misrepresentation was made by The Exchange, as established in Exhibit P-008. As such, Prayer for Relief 4 (mislabeled as 3) should be entirely ignored.

If my client is somehow found to be liable for Misrepresentation, the Plaintiff seeks to inflate the Punitive Damages to a whopping $125,000, compared to the award to lcn of just $25,000, based on how much money was spent; the Defense contests this concept, and argues that if these cases are as similar as the Plaintiff contends, then only $25,000 is justified.

5. Fraud did not occur on the fault of Blazora, as the Plaintiff agreed to the new contract. No misrepresentations occurred as part of the Defendant’s actions, and as such, no Fraud occurred. Thus, Prayer for Relief 5 (mislabeled as 4) should be entirely ignored.

If my client is somehow found to be liable for Fraud, the Plaintiff seeks to inflate the Punitive Damages to a whopping $250,000, compared to the award to lcn of just $50,000, based on how much money was spent; the Defense contests this concept, and argues that if these cases are as similar as the Plaintiff contends, then only $50,000 is justified.

6. Any False Advertising that may have occurred was not the fault of Blazora. The Exchange may have produced a false advertisement, but they accepted the culpability for these miscommunications in Exhibit P-008. Thus, Prayer for Relief 6 (mislabeled as 5) should be entirely ignored.

7. Any Misleading Advertising that may have occurred was not the fault of Blazora. The Exchange may have produced a misleading advertisement, but they accepted the culpability for these miscommunications in Exhibit P-008. Thus, Prayer for Relief 7 (mislabeled as 6) should be entirely ignored.

8. Any Market Manipulation that may have occurred was not the fault of Blazora. The Exchange may have manipulated the market, but they accepted the culpability for these miscommunications in Exhibit P-008. Thus, Prayer for Relief 8 (mislabeled as 7) should be entirely ignored.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff agreed to the modified terms, which nullifies the idea that the Defendant “[misrepresented] the amount of interest to be paid out” which was key to the verdict of [2025] FCR 18. Thus, this is a second reason to entirely ignore Prayer for Relief 8 (mislabeled as 7).

9. $400,000 in additional punitive damages is an outrageous request, especially when the Plaintiff asserts that in an allegedly quite similar case, the amount was $100,000. Thus, even if everything the Plaintiff has said so far is true (which it isn’t), only $100,000 would be reasonable.

Regardless, as shown throughout this Opening Statement, Blazora Corporation has met all of their obligations, and no damages should be awarded whatsoever.

In Conclusion
The Plaintiff has lost little to nothing throughout these events, only receiving a couple of payments a bit late, yet is attempting to receive over $1.3 Million for some made-up damages, and the Defendant is not liable for a cent of it.

Surely, a Learned and Honorable Federal Court Judge will see through the heinous motivations behind this lawsuit - the Plaintiff does not seem to be seeking justice, but a payday.

 

[juniperfig]

As no witnesses have been called, we shall proceed directly to closing statements.

The Plaintiff has 72 hours to submit their closing statement.

 

[Smallfries]

The Plaintiff requests a 48 hour extension due to practical IRL concerns.

 

[juniperfig]

The Plaintiff requests a 48 hour extension due to practical IRL concerns.

Approved.

 

[Smallfries]

We would like to request a 4 hour extension to 12:09AM Central time, tomorrow morning.

Spoiler: help

law school beating my ass bruh

 

[juniperfig]

We would like to request a 4 hour extension to 12:09AM Central time, tomorrow morning.

Spoiler: help

law school beating my ass bruh

Granted.

 

[Smallfries]

Closing Statement

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF REDMONT
CLOSING STATEMENT

Your honor,

The arguments of the defense are quite concerning and border on perjury. It is frightening to see this total collapse in legal standards and professionalism as the defense misrepresents, obfuscates, and in some cases outright lies about the facts in order to attempt to salvage the Defendant’s despicable, greedy, and outrageous behavior. Opposing counsel here attempts to misrepresent what they ruled on in that case, but it cannot be denied that he unequivocally held against Nexalin, and as a matter of law ruled that Nexalin was liable in some part for all of the claims submitted against him; which make up the bulk of the claims here.

The defense’s argument fails because it asks the court to blatantly go against legal precedent not only in a case similar to this one, but arising directly out of the same case or controversy. It also fails due to common sense and basic date-checking, because the Plaintiff has enough fingers on his hand to count how many months the bond ran before even the calling of the bond on the 27th of February. (Spoiler, it is more than three.) Further, the argument fails because it is wholly unreasonable, illogical, and absurd to deny the Plaintiff relief in this matter, caused or influenced wholly by the Defendant’s laziness and greed.

Spoiler: Statement of Facts

Statement of Facts​

In order to aid the court in cutting through the noise, the facts of this case should be laid out simply:

1. Nexalin, through his corporation, sold shares of a bond, which many individuals including the Plaintiff, MegaMinerM, purchased.

2. Nexalin was asked several times to pay interest, and did not. After quite some time, two months after the first month of the bond elapsed, the Defendant paid out first one interest payment, and then after the third month passed, a second.

3. Afterwards, the Defendant, through the Exchange, announced that there was a set of hidden terms that secretly applied to the bond the entire time. In the three full months that had elapsed since the bond was issued, the Defendant had made no attempt at revealing these “true” terms.

4. lcn, a fellow bondholder, brought suit alleging many of the same complaints as the Plaintiff here, and that case was born out of the exact same controversy as this one. In that case, the Defendant did not even attempt to defend their monstrous behavior, and the Judge there wisely granted summary judgment to the Plaintiff. The Judge there could have denied any of the claims—indeed, he asked the Plaintiff for an explanation regarding one of them, market manipulation—but did not except for holding that between October 1 and January 1, there were only three interest payments owed and two had been paid, so he modified the relief to only grant one interest payment.

5. The Judge in that case granted all other reliefs in full, holding Nexalin liable for breach of contract (“the failure to do so was a breach of contract”), Misrepresentation (“The Plaintiff contends that Blazora misrepresented . . . The Federal Court is satisfied with this argument as well.”), Fraud (“It is already established that the terms of the bond were misrepresented, and it takes no deep analysis to realize that [there] is certainly a quantifiable injury.”), False Advertisement (“For the same reasons as the bond was misrepresented, the court is satisfied there was a False Advertisement.”), Misleading Advertisement (“For the same reasons as the bond was misrepresented, the court is satisfied that there was a Misleading Advertisement.”), and Market Manipulation (“by misrepresenting the amount of interest to be paid out, seems to have occurred here.”).

6. After the public and private petitions from lcn, and then the very public lawsuit with some punitive damages, Nexalin still did not pay out any interest to any of the other bondholders. Two days after that lawsuit was ruled, Nexalin called the bond, notably not appealing or challenging the ruling against him.

7. MegaMinerM publicly asked for when the now-called bond would be paid out. Failing to get a response, Mega then went to file this action, on the 17th of March. At this time, Mega had only received two interest payments—the same two interest payments that lcn had received in their case originating two months prior.

8. Three days later, according to the Brief so helpfully provided by The Exchange and ironically relied on by the defense, Nexalin (perhaps panicked by this very case as he saw the walls closing around him) decided to take the matter of his unscrupulous actions seriously and both obtained legal counsel and requested The Exchange to finally begin processing the payouts he requested nearly a month earlier.

9. A week later, Nexalin (through the exchange) paid back the principal amount to Mega, as well as a single round of interest.

This brings us to the present day.

Spoiler: Section I

Despite ignoring precedent set by his own counsel, Nexalin absolutely breached contract and owes at least one month of interest.​

As noted by the verdict in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, between October 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025, three interest payments were owed. This was for the months of October, November, and December. Interest was paid first in late December, and then in early January. The Judge in that case ruled that lcn surely entered into a contract when he purchased the bond, and the hidden terms only revealed months after the contract was formed were illegitimate and could not control, as they did not, could not, and would not ever form a valid contract. Thus, because Nexalin had only paid out two interest payments and three months had elapsed between October 1 and January 1, a third interest payment was owed. This relief was only paid out to lcn, and Mega did not benefit.

Further, taking out a calendar and observing the first months of the current year conclusively prove that the months of January and February exist. Indeed, a negligible amount of brain power can be used to place a mental note on the date of February 27th, the date Nexalin decided to “call” his bond. With this critical and highly cerebral fact in mind, a highly-skilled and wizened member of society may be able to notice that between October 1, 2024, and February 27, 2025, there are four full months elapsing, and ~96.4% of another month. This is, in total, ~99.3% of five months.

An additional intellectual exercise may be conducted where we connect two important pieces of information: (1) As of the filing of this lawsuit, two interest payments were made, and (2) after the filing of this lawsuit, one interest payment was made upon the principal being returned (not to worry, dear reader, more on that later.) This accounts for a total of three interest payments, which corresponds to three months, or exactly 60% of five months. This is nearly 40% less than the figure in the paragraph above—two full months. It stands to reason, then, that at least some amount of that 40% is owed to the Plaintiff.

The defense, understandably, was not able to make the above connections. They can be excused, we in the Plaintiff’s camp are ourselves highly exerted by the effort. But with the work having been done, we can see that the defense’s claim that “there was only interest required for January” is plainly false. At the time of filing, only two interest payments had been made. Assuming, as the defense does, that February was not owed (it is, see heady calculations above) this means four full calendar months had elapsed between the beginning of October and the beginning of February (as opposing counsel has admitted in their previous judgment that October was owed, and opposing counsel admitted in their opening statement that January was owed).

To indulge in one final calculation in this section: Four minus two equals two. Four full months before the bond was called minus two interest payments made equals two remaining interest payments owed. The Defendant, after the case was filed, claims to have made another. Two minus one equals one. Plaintiff’s counsel triple-checked this math, cross-referencing his scientific calculator with first the five fingers on his left hand, and then the five fingers on his right hand, and came out with the same result. The Defendant, clearly, owes at least one more month of interest.

The defense, lazily and shockingly, attempts to deny this obvious fact. We are not sure if their deficiency lies with their mathematical skills, moral character, or their calendars, but that deficiency does not hold up to simple scrutiny. First, they say that “Exhibit P-006 assuredly shows that no interest was due for October, and the interest payments made were for November and December, and then owed interest for January.” This is clearly incorrect, as the hidden terms could not bind someone who was not aware of them at the time of the contract being made. Opposing counsel agreed with this contention in his ruling in lcn v. Blazora Corporation, and to suggest otherwise borders on perjury and egregious manipulation/misrepresentation of the facts.

Likewise, the defense offered a similarly shocking revelation that the month of February has more than twenty-seven days. Plaintiff’s counsel, upon this realization, rushed to his abacus to crunch the numbers, and concedes that February does indeed have more than twenty-seven days. However, this does not matter at all. The defense has stuck their tongue out and put their fingers in their ears, loudly touting: “Haha! The month of February had not happened before the bond was called, so you don’t get interest! The full month needs to elapse before you are due anything!”

This is quite silly, and perhaps also quite a bit rude. Ill manners aside, it is obvious that the defense is incorrect. First, if we turn our heads back to the calendar, we can see that the date of February 27 falls in the month of February. Thus, the month of February has happened. That “February” is a future event at that point, ~96.4% of the way through the whole month, is absurd and clearly angled to get out of paying money.

It is clear that this claim is based solely on the hope of avoiding payments (a common theme, as we will see later in this statement). If I could take a loan from a bank, but it was held as law that I only owed interest when the entire month was completed, I would simply wait until the day before the end of the month and then say I was done with the loan—exactly as the Defendant has done here.

It follows then that the month of February has interest attached to it as well, as the court holding otherwise means that a borrower could easily recall their obligation a day before interest was set to grow in order to, in essence, gain an entire month of interest-free debt. This is obviously grossly against the spirit of the contract, the spirit of business, and the spirit of the law, and should under no circumstances be entertained.

Going even further, the Defendant held on to the money rightfully owed to the Plaintiff that, according to the Defendant, was no longer to be held by the Defendant after the 27th of February. As noted by the defense and an amicus brief from The Exchange, Nexalin did not request The Exchange begin the process of returning the principal payment (or the third of five owed interest payments, three months late) until March 20th. Because of this, the Defendant unjustly held on to the principal and interest until that date, meaning that the Defendant, if not held liable here, would have controlled an interest-free debt for nearly a month.

This is clearly against the terms of the agreement, and the defense has not—and with the elapsing of discovery and opening statements, cannot—provide evidence that they requested The Exchange to submit the payments earlier. It should be noticed of course that this claim in their opening statement goes directly against The Exchange’s statement in their amicus brief. Somebody is lying, and as far as the Plaintiff can see, it is only The Exchange that has brought up receipts. Though the defense alleges otherwise, they did not attempt to prove or even give dates as to if or when they previously made the request.

Because of this, the Plaintiff is surely entitled to the extra day of interest from February—the full month, now—as well as the first twenty days of the month of March. This comes to $11,962.13.

The Plaintiff also is entitled to an additional amount from this because of the extreme and unforgivable delay in which the interest was delayed. The math is laid out in the original complaint, but in assuming a 7% return from re-invested interest payments, the Plaintiff is owed a further $6,249. The defense claims “there is no evidence that the Plaintiff would make 7% interest on the interest.”

This claim, as the kids say, is “cap.” The Plaintiff easily points to the bond in controversy, which offered a 7% interest on its own face value. GnomeWhisperer v. Commonwealth of Redmont held that damages would be awarded for “calculations for the missed business opportunities,” finding that $284,000 in relief would be granted to the plaintiff there because without the actions of the defendant they would have been able to earn more money through their actions at a reasonable price they proved through previous actions.

Here, the same can be done. The Plaintiff once again gestures broadly to the Defendant’s own offering of a bond giving 7% interest. Indeed, 7% interest is perhaps low, as the trading price of the bond was much lower than the face value. Bondholders were able to purchase $100 of face value with a 7% monthly interest for lower than $100, so it stands to reason that the money that could have been re-invested had the Defendant given all of the interest (preferably on time) would have been able to be re-invested for even more money. This interest being kept by the Defendant possibly allowed the Defendant to do the same. The Future Value of Money is a basic principle in finance that says that money now is worth more than the same amount, or even more money being given in the future based on a return of investment one can get right now. In keeping money longer than they should have, the Defendant profited, and the Plaintiff suffered.

Because of this fact, and the basic calendar observations from earlier, even despite the Defendant’s pitiful attempt to negate damages after suit had been filed (more on that latter, I promise. Oh boy do I promise.), the Defendant breached the contract and the Plaintiff is still entitled to interest for the months of January and February, an amount coming to $36,456. The Plaintiff is further entitled to damages from the twenty days in March that Nexalin did not attempt to restore the principal in, as well as resulting in the loss of future re-invested income due to the Defendant’s untimely and manifestly late payment of both the principal bond amount, and every single interest payment.

Spoiler: Section II

Despite the Defendant’s impassioned pleas that they totally asked The Exchange to process their payments, they have provided zero evidence or even dates as to when they asked, while the Plaintiff has brought great bushels of evidence and accepted what was supposed to be a Defendant-friendly amicus brief in our own case.​

In GnomeWhisperer v. Commonwealth of Redmont, the verdict in that case reads: “This case has been one which required a mountain of evidence and deliberation - something we did not receive . . . the Plaintiff has also submitted persuasive evidence . . . the defense has not provided any evidence to back up their claims.” GnomeWhisperer v. Commonwealth of Redmont. Here, the defense has made claims and argumentation for which they have brought no evidence.

Specifically, the defense has claimed they are not liable for announcements made by the Exchange and because they allegedly requested the exchange pay out to their bondholders “at least twice.” However, they do not provide evidence for either.

For the first, they say that they have an “alternative” and “entirely plausible” scenario in which someone familiar with the actions of Nexalin took it upon themselves to inform The Exchange, who then maliciously informed the public of various facts regarding Nexalin’s actions as agent of Blazora Corporation, who was the true victim in this case.

This is obviously wrong and patently absurd. Could it, theoretically, have been possible that The Exchange posted information without Nexalin’s consent the first time? Possibly, though this is unlikely due to the business relationship between the two and The Exchange’s sensitivity to lawsuits if this was true. However, after the second, and third, and fourth, and so on messages on behalf of Nexalin, you would think that if it truly was against their consent—or if The Exchange was making materially false statements—at some point Nexalin would have spoken up.

This failure to correct the posts that The Exchange made for them speaks to Nexalin’s acceptance of them as correct and on their behalf. It would put an undue burden on the Plaintiff to try to “prove” this, and instead the burden of proof must fall to the defense. The failure to do so shows that the defense is merely making “what-if” arguments to distract the court from the truth of the matter. Nexalin clearly approved of these messages and likely authored or directly authorized them himself.

The defense further claims that they totally tried to send out the money “at least twice.” They point to the amicus brief filed by The Exchange as proof of this fact. But a cursory glance at that brief only mentions a single attempt on the 20th of March, three days after the filing of this suit and the same day that Nexalin acquired legal counsel. A curious coincidence, perhaps, but certainly not enough to prove their claim. As far as this court can see, the first (and only) time Nexalin asked The Exchange to pay out his bondholders was after this suit was filed—presumably after his legal counsel urged him to get his act together and stop short changing his investors.

All the defense has to show for their claim that they requested The Exchange to pay out money to their bondholders is an amicus brief which only indicates they requested the bondholders be paid out nearly a month after the bond was called. The burden of proof is on the defense for this, and failing to provide any evidence, should be cast aside with no further thought.

All the defense has to show for their claim that they should not be liable for statements made in the discord channel is that over the course of several months, a theoretical possibility exists that The Exchange could have possibly heard insider information and made official statements on Nexalin’s behalf. Even if this was true, however, it is laughably absurd to make this argument with a straight face, as there was no point in those many months between those many messages that Nexalin disagreed or disapproved of any of the messages, and so he implicitly approved and authorized them by silence in the defense’s alternate version of reality.

The more likely answer, however, is that they indeed did contact Nexalin and ask for permission to post the various messages, and those were given. This is evidenced most convincingly by P-007, which shows a message addressed directly to Nexalin’s investors and signed by Nexalin at the bottom. Nexalin clearly signed off on this message, and it is delusional, farcical, or good old-fashioned lying to say otherwise. Either way, the claims for false and misleading advertising, and others, are made out.

The defense does not provide any evidence to back either of their claims, while the Plaintiff has provided a “mountain of evidence and deliberation” to back theirs. Further, the Federal Court has already ruled in lcn v. Blazora Corp. that Blazora is liable for false and misleading advertising, inter alia, and to claim otherwise (as that presiding Judge no less) just because “in theory there could be another argument” is absurd. As a matter of law, Nexalin falsely advertised, misleadingly advertised, inter alia. It cannot be up to contention in this case, unless some new evidence is brought to light; which it has not.

Because of this, the defense’s arguments fail, and the Defendant as a matter of law must be held liable for the above breaches and infractions, stare decisis must remain unmolested, and the defense’s odd and unsubstantiated claims must be tossed aside.

Spoiler: Section III

Nexalin formed a second contract, as “modifying” a contract unilaterally that all engaged parties did not agree to goes clearly against the law​

A contract is an agreement, unwritten or otherwise, between two or more parties which establishes duties and responsibilities on both sides. To quote Judge Dartanboy: “There is no doubt that, in the court’s opinion, an offering of any stock, bond, fund, or similar in a Stock Exchange constitutes a contract once accepted.” lcn v. Blazora Corporation.

It is settled law that a contract was formed when the bond was first purchased, as the defense concedes. It is also settled and undeniable law that this contract was broken when Nexalin did not pay the interest owed to his bondholders. Nexalin continues to break his contract by not paying out the still-owed past interest, as explained in a previous section above.

What is not yet settled, but just as true, is that a second contract was formed, and Nexalin broke that as well. While the first contract had a right to be called, it was not. As shown in P-003, the terms of the deal stated that the bond would mature on 1 January, 2025. Pursuant to the Clarity Act, the Oxford Dictionary defines “mature” as: “(of an insurance policy, security, etc.) reach the end of its term and hence becomes payable.” Here, the bond reached the end of its term on the first of January. Before this happened, Nexalin (through The Exchange) asked his bondholders to “extend the bond’s interest payments by an additional 6 months beyond the current maturity date . . . this would mean an additional interest payment for each month during the extended period. (Emphasis, including bold, added) It is important to note the words “would” and “for each month” are absolute terms, and will be taken to mean that the Defendant was promising that for each month, additional interest would be paid out. Not may for some months, not possibly for every other month; would for each month.

When this vote passed, Nexalin created a new contract as the previous contract only covered the first three months, from October 1, 2025, to January 1, 2025. This must be the case, as the maturation of the bond means that it reached the end of its term, and no longer was in force. Thus, a new contract (without a provision stating it could be called early) was created, and calling it so soon is in breach, owing relief to MegaMinerM and all other bondholders. The defense may argue some nonsense about the hidden contract shown by P-006, but this should be disregarded as those terms, as proven in court and by reason here cannot control and do not make an effectual contract.

The defense argues that this contract was merely an extension of that previous contract, not a new one altogether. However, the original contract has a clear maturation date of the first of January, and changing the terms of a contract cannot be done unless both parties agree to it. As shown in P-007, two bondholders disagreed with the vote, so it would be unfair to say that the original bond’s terms were unilaterally changed as to the relationship between the nay voters and Nexalin. Instead, it is clear that justice demands that what in fact occurred was a new contract was offered when the vote passed, saying: “We at Blazora will hold out these bonds for six more months, paying interest each month.” Mega, in not selling his shares or demanding the contract be cancelled, agreed to these terms. This new contract had no provision that said it could be unilaterally cancelled by the bond issuer, and so MegaMinerM was unpleasantly damaged when Nexalin did so.

Finally, it is ridiculous to say that because Mega agreed to make this new contract (or for the sake of argument to extend the original one, somehow) that he agreed to forfeit his October interest payment. This is patently false and goes entirely against the law, as a contract requires consideration. The defense is claiming that, without consideration, the Plaintiff revoked his right to more money. Even if the terms of the vote said that would be the case (they did not), that would clearly not hold up in court because the elements of a contract mandate bargained-for consideration, which was not given.

Thus, because a new contract was formed with no term in it saying that Nexalin could call it early, and the terms of the vote said “This would mean an additional interest payment for each month during the extended period,” and the previous contract obviously elapsed on the first of January, Nexalin is in breach of this second contract and owes to Mega interest for every month of 2025 from January to the true end of this new contract, July. In total, this is $109,368 of principal interest, if delivered on-time.

Spoiler: Section IV

Precedent favors the bold, and the Plaintiff in this matter, and if the defense truly disagreed or thought that another party was truly liable, they would have appealed or sued that party respectively. The failure to do so admits more than any argument the defense makes​

Make no mistake, dear reader: Everything alleged in this complaint did happen. It is settled law, thanks to the work of opposing counsel while he was Judge. The argument that “Well, if the Defendant cared enough to argue the first time he could have come up with… something,” is not an argument that can be credibly made when the Judge in that case took specific steps to rule that as a matter of law the Defendant was liable. The defense, in turn, wants the court today to overturn a past civil action holding somebody liable for an offense against another. This is, frankly, ridiculous and should be dismissed out of hand.

If the Defendant truly believed these facts to be untrue, he would have appealed the first case, but did not. He may have also counter-sued for slander or libel, but did not. If the Defendant truly believed that for some claims it was not him but The Exchange that was liable, he would have sued them for damages from the first case as in that scenario The Exchange would have caused the damages, as helpfully pointed out by the defense in section four of their opening statement.

The fact that the defense has done none of these things clearly points out that they are not confident in their arguments and do not believe they would succeed on the merits. The court should not grant this absurd argument any leniency, because the defense had the opportunity to sue The Exchange after the first lawsuit, and had the opportunity to initiate a third-party claim in this suit. Failing to do so logically means the defense likely understands they have no real claim here, and they would lose even more money. The only intended effect of this argument, then, is to try to shield themselves from harm and make the court force the Plaintiff to sue The Exchange, and risk losing because the blame shifted from Nexalin in this case does belong to him, not The Exchange. In short, they need to put up or shut up.

In closing, the defense’s arguments that the punitive damages (fraud, false advertising, etc.) should be discarded because in addition to failing to prove that Nexalin did not do those actions through a combination of a lack of rational argumentation and (any) evidence, those claims are backed by opposing counsel’s own affirmative decision in the previous case. All of those punitive damages, as a matter of law, must be granted to the Plaintiff here.

Spoiler: Section V

The increased prayer for relief as to the punitive damages are just due to Nexalin’s failure to change for the better, as well as the heightened non-punitive case value​

Establishing now that all of the claims should be held, we turn now to the fact of the numbers. The defense offers the paltry excuse that “If [their] client is somehow found [liable], [the damages] only [the damages from the first case are] justified.” This is a laughable premise that should be ignored. The defense wishes to woo the court down to the original numbers from that previous lawsuit, but this is bereft of sense for three reasons: (1) Punitive damages are meant to be punitive, and seek to discourage bad behavior, (2) Nexalin did not learn his lesson the first time, and (3) the increase in case value warrants an increase in punitive value.

First, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish bad actors for bad behavior. In lcn v. Blazora Corp., the Judge in that case, on top of all other damages, held Nexalin liable for $100,000 in punitive damages in an explicit attempt to stop them from doing the activity complained of again. After this decision was handed down, Nexalin continued to not pay his interest owed, and then this suit arose. This repetition in behavior should not be punished by a mere repeat of a previous fine, but instead a step up.

Second, it is clear that Nexalin did not learn his lesson the first time. If the point of punitive damages is to punish bad behavior and ensure that the behavior is not repeated, the punitive damages from the first case—including a $100,000 fee at the end—were not high enough to succeed. It is further clear that upon making the increase in damages and filing the suit, Nexalin very quickly found legal representation (the Judge that ruled in his previous case no less) and began working to try to mitigate his damages as discussed in a section below. This is convincing to the Plaintiff that this amount of punitive damages will finally convince the Defendant of the error of his anti-social ways, and is necessary to effect justice. As a matter of basic economics, equilibrium has been found. The court should not stand in the way of market efficiency.

Finally, it would be silly to grant the same amount of punitive damages to the Plaintiff here that were granted to the plaintiff in the previous case because of the Plaintiff here’s much larger stake in the matter. If we were to say that all individuals impacted by Nexalin’s fraudulent behavior should be granted the same punitive damages, then an individual who purchased only one share of the bond (worth $100) could sue and receive nearly $200,000 worth of punitive damages. This is clearly nonsensical, and so the court should apply a scaling damages test that weighs the relative value of the non-punitive damages.

Because punitive damages seek to punish individuals for bad behavior and we should not give the same punishment for the same repeated offense, Nexalin did not learn his lesson the first time he was punished for this same offense, and because of the much larger value of the non-punitive damages and the unreasonableness of holding all potential cases equal despite case value, the Plaintiff’s increase of punitive damages by 4-5x is reasonable and should be granted by the court.

Spoiler: Section VI

The Defendant took unscrupulous and immoral methods of trying to lower their exposure after they were caught, and this sort of behavior should not be rewarded​

The defense alleges that they paid back the principal and (one) interest payment, so they should be totally off the hook for that even if the rest of the damages are proven. While it is true that the amicus brief filed by The Exchange shows that the principal and one interest were (eventually) paid off, justice demands that those claims remain on the board for the total calculation of damages.

The Plaintiff here is not asking for the court to order Nexalin to pay a second ~$260,000 to make up for the principal, as this would be unjust, and the Plaintiff is reasonable and seeks only justice for Nexalin’s horrible actions. Instead, the Plaintiff humble asks the court in their finding for the Plaintiff to rule that Nexalin is liable for the amount claimed for the Principal, and to credit the amount paid in the middle of the case after calculating all damages.

The clear intent of the Defendant here is to lower the total value of the case mid-litigation in order to lower the legal fees they have to pay. This is a clear manipulation of the law and should not be rewarded. If I were to rob a bank of $1,000,000 and in the criminal proceedings against me the Government were to demand $1,000,000 in restitution plus other criminal charges, the court would surely not allow me to return that $1,000,000 mid-case and then demand that legal fees be lowered.

Congress, in mandating a 30% case value legal fee, explicitly demanded that lawyers be paid properly for their efforts. By allowing defendants to cast a wide net of anti-social behavior and then cough up restitution mid-case in order to lower those legal fees, the court would both be incentivizing more crime (and thus, more cases on an already overworked judiciary) and destroying the intended purpose of Congressional action.

Thus, because the Defendant is clearly trying to evade their responsibility to pay for their crimes and finally pay a minimum of what they believe they owe in order to escape paying more later, the court should hold that both the principal and the interest payment allegedly paid by The Exchange should factor in to the calculations for legal fees, and then be credited after that.

Spoiler: Section VII

Dishonorable and immoral conduct should not be rewarded, celebrated, or tolerated in Redmont, and it is important to make this known now​

In conclusion, it is clear to the Plaintiff that the defense has scrambled to misrepresent facts and arguments as quickly as possible in order to shore up any sort of defense possible. They have presented no evidence, no witnesses, no shred of credible arguments, and have totally abrogated the responsibility of professional argumentation before a court in a desperate plea to reduce or eliminate rightful damages owed.

Nexalin, for his part, has engaged in a clear pattern of reckless, lazy, greedy, and demonstrably unethical and immoral behavior that far outstrips any crook on the street. When finally caught, and the light of justice began to eviscerate the shadows where he hid, he attempted to shed a small amount of his ill-gotten gains in the hopes of pleasing the aggrieved Plaintiff in this case, and when that failed, in an attempt to hold up his hands and pleading his innocence while bags full of stolen coins clink behind his back.

MegaMinerM, and all of the other bondholders, are owed interest for the months of January and February, as proven by a simple observation of a calendar. They are owed interest for the first twenty days of March, as well as restitution for the delayed payment over those months to make up for the failure of Nexalin to give them their money in a timely manner resulting in a loss of value. Nexalin must also be made to pay the scaled punitive damages as claimed, so he will hopefully learn his lesson and become a better part of our society.

We grant a large amount of trust to businesses. They hold our money, our property, control our shops and homes, and have an outsized voice in Government. In return, they provide services and efficient transactions that are supposed to provide a rising tide that lifts all boats. A shady and underhanded robber-baron such as in this case undermines this trust, and casts a wide shadow across all honest businessmen. Any person who runs a business or acts as an investor should be appalled by the Defendant’s conduct in this case, and clamor for the full, unadulterated granting of relief in favor of MegaMinerM.

We also grant an extremely outsized role in our society to lawyers. These individuals, trained and educated in the law, are supposed to be the bedrock of our society, the Atlas of Government that upholds civilization and carries on their back the duty to adjudicate and resolve disputes so they do not descend into barbaric and animalistic violence. Opposing counsel in this case has clearly violated that trust, shrewdly “re-interpreting” their previous decision on a matter extremely similar to and closely related to this, in order to try to win.

The Plaintiff recognizes that the pool of talent in Redmont is small, and it would not forbid all former Judicial Officers from participating in a case which may cite a ruling they had a hand in. However, it does shock the conscience to see a Judge from one case later take up the mantle of counsel in a matter directly descended from that same case; doubly so when representing the loser in the first case. If a robbery were to come before the court with two perpetrators, and a Judge ruled against one, but then resigned and defended the other, there would be unceasing outrage over that conduct. Why should the case be any different here?

This is a delicate case, and it is clear the defense has acted immorally and unscrupulously in order to try to pull out all the stops and deflect from a blow that is finally strong enough to warrant the Defendant’s attention and care. The Judiciary has a chance today to strike against corruption, white-collar theft, and the breaking down of social order. Against the Defendant, the charges are clear, and the remedies even more so. Adopt all of the Plaintiff’s requested claims, and order, justice, and freedom will be restored in Redmont. It is further hoped that the Court recognizes the size, scope, and effort put into this writing, and takes that as a sign of a true worry for the legal and societal fabric of the Commonwealth. The Plaintiff hopes the Court will take this matter seriously.

Thank you.

 

[ColonelKai]

Thank you. The defendant has 72 hours to submit their closing statements.

 

[Dartanboy]

Thank you. The defendant has 72 hours to submit their closing statements.

Your honor, I will very busy this weekend, could I get a 24 hour extension?

 

[ColonelKai]

Granted.